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Abstract
Optimistic Gradient Descent Ascent (OGDA) algorithm for saddle-point optimiza-
tion has received growing attention due to its favorable last-iterate convergence.
However, its behavior for simple two-player matrix games is still not fully under-
stood — previous analysis lacks explicit convergence rates, only applies to expo-
nentially small learning rate, or requires additional conditions such as uniqueness
of the optimal solution. In this work, we significantly expand the understanding
of OGDA, introducing a set of sufficient conditions under which OGDA exhibits
concrete last-iterate convergence rates with a constant learning rate. Specifically,
we show that matrix games satisfy these conditions and OGDA converges exponen-
tially fast without any additional assumptions. More generally, our conditions hold
for smooth bilinear functions and strongly-convex-strongly-concave functions over
a constrained set. We provide experimental results to further support our theory.
To further demonstrate the significance of our results for matrix games, we greatly
generalize the ideas to finite-horizon stochastic/Markov games and provide the
first algorithm that simultaneously ensures 1) linear last-iterate convergence when
playing against itself and 2) low regret when playing against an arbitrary slowly-
changing opponent.
1 Introduction
Saddle-point optimization in the form of minx maxy f(x, y) dates back to [32], where the celebrated
minimax theorem was discovered. Due to advances of Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) [19]
(which itself is a saddle-point problem), the question of how to find a good approximation of the
saddle point, especially via an efficient iterative algorithm, has recently gained significant research
interest. Simple algorithms such as Gradient Descent Ascent (GDA) and Multiplicative Weight
Updates (MWU) is known to cycle and fails to converge even in simple bilinear cases (see e.g., [5]).
Many recent works consider resolving this issue via simple modifications of standard algorithms,
usually in the form of some extra gradient descent/ascent steps. This includes Extra-Gradient methods
(EG) [27, 31], Optimistic Gradient Descent Ascent (OGDA) [12, 17, 30], Optimistic Multiplicative
Weight Updates (OMWU) [10, 26], and others. In particular, OGDA and OMWU are especially
suitable for a repeated game setting where two players repeatedly propose xt and yt and receive only
∇xf(xt, yt) and ∇yf(xt, yt) respectively as feedback, with the goal of converging to a saddle point
or equivalently a Nash equilibrium using game theory terminology.
Despite considerable progress, especially those for the unconstrained setting, the behavior of these
algorithms for the constrained setting, where x and y are restricted to compact convex sets X and Y
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respectively, is still not fully understood. This is even true when f is a bilinear function and X and
Y are simplex, known as the classic two-player zero-sum games in normal form, or simply matrix
games. Indeed, existing convergence results on the last iterate of OGDA or OMWU for matrix games
are unsatisfactory — they lack explicit convergence rates [33], only apply to exponentially small
learning rate thus not reflecting the behavior of the algorithms in practice [10], or require additional
conditions such as uniqueness of the equilibrium or a good initialization of the algorithms [10].
Motivated by this fact, in this work, we significantly expand the understanding of OGDA for
constrained and smooth convex-concave saddle-point problems. Specifically, we start with proving an
average duality gap convergence of OGDA at the rate of O(1/
√
T ) after T iterations. Then, to obtain
a more favorable last-iterate convergence in terms of distance to the set of equilibria, we propose two
general sufficient conditions called Generalized Saddle-Point Restricted Secant Inequality (SP-RSI),
under which we prove concrete last-iterate convergence rates for OGDA, all with a constant learning
rate and without further assumptions.
Our last-iterate convergence results greatly generalize that of [21, Theorem 2], which itself is a
consolidated version of results from several earlier works. The key implication of our new results is
that, by showing that matrix games satisfy our SP-RSI condition, we provide by far the most general
last-iterate convergence guarantee with a linear rate for this problem with OGDA. Our result does
not suffer from the drawbacks of existing works mentioned earlier — it holds even when there are
multiple equilibria and it is achieved with a constant learning rate and any initialization.
More generally, the same linear last-iterate convergence holds for any bilinear games over polytopes
since they also satisfy the SP-RSI condition as we show. To complement this result, we construct an
example of a bilinear game with a non-polytope feasible set where OGDA provably does not ensure
linear convergence, indicating that the shape of the feasible set matters. We also provide experimental
results to support our theory, which in particular show that OGDA indeed converges faster than
OMWU.
Finally, to further showcase the significance of our results for matrix games, we greatly generalize
the ideas to episodic stochastic games (a.k.a. Markov games). We show that using OGDA at each
state with appropriate feedback ensures both linear convergence to an equilibrium when playing
against itself and at the same time a worst-case regret guarantee when playing against an arbitrary
slowly-changing opponent. As far as we know, this is the first algorithm for stochastic games with
these two properties simultaneously and both with concrete finite-time bounds. Our regret bound is
also better than the recent work of Radanovic et al. [34], which considers a variant of OMWU.
2 Related Work
Average-iterate convergence. While showing last-iterate convergence has been a challenging task,
it is well-known that the average-iterate of many standard algorithms such as GDA and MWU
enjoys a converging duality gap at the rate of O(1/
√
T ) [15]. A line of works show that the rate
can be improved to O(1/T ) using the “optimistic” version of these algorithms such as OGDA and
OMWU [35, 11, 36]. For tasks such as training GANs, however, average-iterate convergence is
unsatisfactory since averaging large neural networks is usually prohibited.
Extra-Gradient (EG) algorithms. The saddle-point problem fits into the more general variational
inequality framework [20]. A classic algorithm for variational inequalities is EG, first introduced
in [25]. Tseng [37] is the first to prove last-iterate convergence for EG in various settings such as
bilinear or smooth strongly-convex-strongly-concave problems. Recent works significantly expand
the understanding of EG and its variants for unconstrained bilinear problems [27], unconstrained
strongly-convex-strongly-concave problems [31], and more [42, 28, 18].
The original EG is not applicable to a repeated game setting where only one gradient evaluation is
possible in each iteration. However, there are variants of EG that allow so. In fact, some of these
versions coincide with the OGDA algorithm under different names such as modified Arrow–Hurwicz
method [33] and “extrapolation from the past” [17]. Nevertheless, to best of our knowledge, none of
the existing results covers the constrained bilinear case (which is one of our key contributions).
OGDA and OMWU. Recently, last-iterate convergence for OGDA has been proven in various
settings such as convex-concave problems [12], unconstrained bilinear problems [8, 27], strongly-
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convex-strongly-concave problems [31], and others (e.g. [30]). However, the behavior of OGDA for
the constrained bilinear case, or even the special case of classic matrix games, appears to be much
more mysterious and less understood. Daskalakis and Panageas [10] show last-iterate convergence of
OMWU for matrix games under a uniqueness assumption and without a concrete rate. Although
it was implicitly suggested in [10, 9] that a rate of O(1/T 1/9) is possible, the bound still has an
exponential dependence on the size of the matrix. As mentioned, our results significantly improve
theirs, with a clean linear rate and without the uniqueness assumption.
Rational and convergent learning in Stochastic Games. Stochastic Games (SGs) are important
in modeling multi-agent reinforcement learning [29]. The early work of Bowling and Veloso
[3] advocated that a good multi-agent learning algorithm should have two desirable properties
simultaneously: rationality and convergence. By their definition, a rational algorithm converges to its
opponent’s best response if its opponent converges to a stationary policy, and a convergent algorithm
converges to a stationary policy if all agents use the same algorithm. Although these definitions
are intuitive and even sound easy to achieve, to the best of our knowledge, there are no provably
simultaneously rational and convergent algorithms for general SGs, other than some heuristics that
provide empirical evidence [3], or algorithms for the simplest case of matrix games [2, 7]. Recently,
several works propose algorithms for finding the equilibrium of two-player zero-sum SGs and
quantify the sample complexity [38, 23, 1, 39]; however, their algorithms require the two players to
jointly decide their policies, and thus do not provide rationality against arbitrary opponents. Other
works [29, 4, 22, 38, 39] propose algorithms that can compete with arbitrary opponents; however,
they are conservative and cannot converge to their opponents’ best response.
Our algorithm not only is the first one that is both rational and convergent, but also enjoys concrete
finite-time bounds for both notions. Although we only consider a setting with full information, we
believe that this is an important first step towards solving this long-open problem more generally.
3 Preliminaries
We consider the following constrained saddle-point problem: minx∈X maxy∈Y f(x, y), where X
and Y are compact convex sets, and f is a continuous differentiable function that is convex in x for
any fixed y and concave in y for any fixed x. By the celebrated minimax theorem [32], we have
minx∈X maxy∈Y f(x, y) = maxy∈Y minx∈X f(x, y).
The set of minimax optimal strategy is denoted by X ∗ = argminx∈X maxy∈Y f(x, y), and the set
of maximin optimal strategy is denoted by Y∗ = argmaxy∈Y minx∈X f(x, y). It is well-known
that X ∗ and Y∗ are compact and convex, and any pair (x∗, y∗) ∈ X ∗ × Y∗ is a Nash equilibrium
satisfying f(x∗, y) ≤ f(x∗, y∗) ≤ f(x, y∗) for any (x, y) ∈ X × Y .
For notational convenience, we define Z = X × Y and similarly Z∗ = X ∗ × Y∗. For a point
z = (x, y) ∈ Z , we further define f(z) = f(x, y) and F (z) = (∇xf(x, y),−∇yf(x, y)).
Our goal is to find a point z ∈ Z that is close to the set of Nash equilibria Z∗, and we consider two
ways of measuring the closeness. The first one is the duality gap, defined as
αf (z) = max
y′∈Y
f(x, y′)− min
x′∈X
f(x′, y).
which is always non-negative since maxy′∈Y f(x, y′) ≥ f(x, y) ≥ minx′∈X f(x′, y). The second
one is the distance between z and Z∗. Specifically, for any compact set A, we define the projection
operator ΠA as ΠA(a) = argmina′∈A ‖a− a′‖ (ties broken arbitrarily; all norms in this work are
2-norm unless specified otherwise). The squared distance between z and Z∗ is then defined as
dist(z,Z∗) = ‖z −ΠZ∗(z)‖2.
Throughout the paper, we make the following two regularity assumptions. The first one is without
loss of generality and assumes that the diameter of the feasible set Z is normalized to 1.
Assumption 1. For any z, z′ ∈ Z , ‖z − z′‖ ≤ 1 holds.
The second one assumes that f is L-smooth, which can be written as the following.
Assumption 2. For any z, z′ ∈ Z , ‖F (z)− F (z′)‖ ≤ L‖z − z′‖ holds.
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Finally, we state a useful lemma related to the duality gap, used in several places of our proofs.
Lemma 1. For any z ∈ Z , we have αf (z) ≤ maxz′∈Z F (z)>(z − z′).
This is a direct consequence of the convexity of f(·, y) and the concavity of f(x, ·):
αf (z) = max
(x′,y′)∈X×Y
(f(x, y′)− f(x, y) + f(x, y)− f(x′, y))
≤ max
(x′,y′)∈X×Y
(∇yf(x, y)>(y′ − y) +∇xf(x, y)>(x− x′)) = max
z′∈Z
F (z)>(z − z′).
Note that the lemma also indicates that maxz′∈Z F (z)>(z − z′) is always non-negative due to the
non-negativity of the duality gap.
3.1 Optimistic Gradient Descent Ascent
We consider solving the problem via an iterative algorithm known as Optimistic (projected) Gradient
Descent Ascent (OGDA). Starting from two arbitrary points ẑ0 = (x̂0, ŷ0) and z0 = (x0, y0) from
Z , OGDA with step size η > 0 iteratively computes the following for t = 1, 2, . . .,
x̂t+1 = ΠX
(
x̂t − η∇xf(xt, yt)
)
, (1)
xt+1 = ΠX
(
x̂t+1 − η∇xf(xt, yt)
)
, (2)
ŷt+1 = ΠY
(
ŷt + η∇yf(xt, yt)
)
, (3)
yt+1 = ΠY
(
ŷt+1 + η∇yf(xt, yt)
)
, (4)
which can be compactly written as
ẑt+1 = ΠZ
(
ẑt − ηF (zt)
)
, (5)
zt+1 = ΠZ
(
ẑt+1 − ηF (zt)
)
. (6)
Note that there are several slightly different versions of the algorithm in the literature, which differ in
the timing of performing the projection. Our version is same as those in [6, 35]. It is also referred to
as “single-call extra-gradient” in [21], but it does not belong to the class of “extra-gradient” methods
discussed in [37, 27, 18] for example.
Also note that OGDA only requires accessing f via its gradient, and in fact, only one gradient at the
point zt for each iteration. This aspect makes it especially suitable for a repeated game setting, where
in each round, one player proposes xt while another player proposes yt. With only the information of
the gradient from the environment (∇xf(xt, yt) for the first player and ∇yf(xt, yt) for the other),
both players can execute the algorithm.
4 Convergence Results
In this section, we provide our main convergence results for the iterate ẑt of OGDA. Specifically, in
Section 4.1 we first provide a convergence guarantee in terms of the duality gap. Then in Section 4.2,
we propose a general condition subsuming many well-studied cases, under which OGDA is shown to
ensure a last-iterate convergence guarantee in terms of the distance between ẑt and Z∗.
Before presenting the main theorems, we first show two important lemmas. The first one shows
the connection between ‖ẑt+1 − z‖2 and ‖ẑt − z‖2 for any z ∈ Z , and the proof follows standard
analysis of OGDA (see e.g., [35, Lemma 1]). For completeness, we provide a proof in Appendix B.
Lemma 2. For any t ≥ 1 and z ∈ Z , OGDA with η ≤ 18L ensures
2ηF (zt)
>(zt − z) ≤ ‖ẑt − z‖2 − ‖ẑt+1 − z‖2 − ‖ẑt+1 − zt‖2 − 1516‖zt − ẑt‖2 + 116‖ẑt − zt−1‖2.
Choosing any z ∈ Z∗ in this lemma, we have F (zt)>(zt − z) ≥ f(xt, yt)− f(x, yt) + f(xt, y)−
f(xt, yt) = f(xt, y) − f(x, yt) ≥ 0 by convexity/concavity and the optimality of z. Further
rearranging then shows that ẑt+1 is closer to z than ẑt as long as ‖ẑt+1 − zt‖2 + 1516‖zt − ẑt‖2 −
1
16‖ẑt − zt−1‖2 is positive, which drives the convergence of ẑt towards Z∗. To this end, in the
following lemma, we provide a lower bound for the main term ‖ẑt+1 − zt‖2 + ‖zt − ẑt‖2.
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Lemma 3. For any t ≥ 0 and z′ ∈ Z with z′ 6= ẑt+1, OGDA with η ≤ 18L ensures
‖ẑt+1 − zt‖2 + ‖zt − ẑt‖2 ≥ 32
81
η2
[
F (ẑt+1)
>(ẑt+1 − z′)
]2
+
‖ẑt+1 − z′‖2 , (7)
where [a]+ , max{a, 0}.
See Appendix B for the proof. Note that the right-hand side of Eq. (7) can be further related to the
duality gap of ẑt+1 through Lemma 1. Thus, the high-level idea of proving last-iterate convergence
emerges: when ẑt+1 has a large duality gap, the term ‖ẑt+1 − zt‖2 + ‖zt − ẑt‖2 has to be large also,
which in turn leads to a large decrease in ‖ẑt+1 − z‖2 compared to ‖ẑt − z‖2 by Lemma 2.
4.1 Duality Gap Convergence
We are now ready to present our first convergence result on the duality gap.
Theorem 4. OGDA with η ≤ 18L ensures 1T
∑T
t=1 αf (ẑt) = O
(
1
η
√
T
)
for any T .
See Appendix C for the proof. This theorem indicates that αf (ẑt) is converging to zero. A conver-
gence rate of αf (ẑt) = O( 1η√t ) would be compatible with the theorem, but is not directly implied by
it. We are only able to prove a concrete convergence rate on αf (ẑt) under further conditions; see
Section 4.2. In a recent work, Golowich et al. [18] consider the unconstrained setting and show that
the extra-gradient algorithm obtains the rate O( 1
η
√
t
), under an extra assumption that the Hessian of
f is also Lipschitz. We also note that the extra-gradient algorithm requires more cooperation between
the two players compared to OGDA and is less suitable for a repeated game setting.
4.2 Pointwise Convergence
Recall the discussion after Lemma 3 that a large duality gap, or rather a large right-hand side of Eq.
(7), ensures a sufficient decrease in dist(ẑt,Z∗). To obtain a last-iterate convergence result, however,
we still need to connect dist(ẑt,Z∗) back to the duality gap. Motivated by this fact, we propose the
following two general conditions on f and Z to achieve so.
Definition 1 (Generalized Saddle-Point Restricted Secant Inequality (SP-RSI)). The SP-RSI-1 and
SP-RSI-2 conditions are defined as: for any z ∈ Z with z∗ = ΠZ∗(z),
(SP-RSI-1) max
z′∈Z
F (z)>(z − z′) ≥ C‖z − z∗‖β+1,
(SP-RSI-2) F (z)>(z − z∗) ≥ C‖z − z∗‖β+2,
holds for some parameter β ≥ 0 and C > 0.
We call these conditions Generalized Saddle-Point Restricted Secant Inequality (SP-RSI) for their
resemblance to the Restricted Secant Inequality [41, 24]. The latter leads to linear convergence in
convex optimization. To the best of our knowledge, our proposed conditions are new for saddle-
point problems. The closest condition in the literature is from a recent work by Hsieh et al. [21]
for variational inequalities (their Assumption 3(s)). In our context, their condition is (F (z) −
F (z′))>(z − z′) ≥ C‖z − z′‖2 for all z, z′ ∈ Z . This in fact implies SP-RSI-2 with β = 0. To
see this, simply set z′ = z∗ and notice that F (z∗)>(z − z∗) ≥ 0 holds by the first-order optimality
condition of z∗. Therefore, our condition SP-RSI-2 is only less stringent and covers more problems.
In fact, under their stronger condition the equilibrium is necessarily unique, but we generally allow
multiple equilibria.
These two conditions might be hard to interpret at first glance, but they subsume many standard
settings studied in the literature. The first and perhaps the most important example is bilinear games
with a polytope feasible set, which in particular includes the classic two-player matrix games as a
special case (since they are bilinear games over the simplex).
Theorem 5. A bilinear game f(x, y) = x>Gy with X ⊆ RM and Y ⊆ RN being polytopes and
G ∈ RM×N satisfies SP-RSI-1 with β = 0.
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Note that we have not provided the concrete form of the parameter C in the theorem (which depends
on X , Y , and G), but it can be found in the proof (see Appendix D). The next example shows that
strongly-convex-strongly-concave problems are also special cases of our condition.
Theorem 6. If f is strongly convex in x and strongly concave in y, then SP-RSI-2 holds with β = 0.
Next, we provide a toy example where SP-RSI-2 only holds with β > 0.
Theorem 7. Let X = Y , {(a, b), 0 ≤ a, b ≤ 1, a + b = 1}, n > 2 be an integer, and
f(x, y) = x(1)2n − x(1)y(1)− y(1)2n. Then SP-RSI-2 holds with β = 2n− 2 but not with β = 0.
Under either condition with any value of β, we show the following last-iterate convergence guarantee
of OGDA, which is one of the main contributions of this work.
Theorem 8. For any η ≤ 18L , if either SP-RSI-1 or SP-RSI-2 holds with β = 0, then OGDA
guarantees linear last-iterate convergence rate:
dist(ẑt,Z∗) ≤ 3(1 + C ′)−t; (8)
on the other hand, if either condition holds with β > 0, then we have
dist(ẑt,Z∗) ≤
(
2 +
(
2
C ′β
) 1
β
)
t−
1
β , (9)
where C ′ , 16η
2 min{C2,L2}
81(1+β)·2β .
We defer the proof to Appendix F and make several remarks. First, note that based on a convergence
result on dist(ẑt,Z∗), one can immediately obtain a convergence guarantee for the duality gap αf (ẑt)
as long as f is also Lipschitz. This is because αf (ẑt) ≤ maxx′,y′ f(x̂t, y′)− f(x∗, y′) + f(x′, y∗)−
f(x′, ŷt) ≤ O(‖x̂t − x∗‖ + ‖ŷt − y∗‖) = O(
√
dist(ẑt,Z∗)) where (x∗, y∗) = ΠZ∗(ẑt). While
this leads to stronger guarantees compared to Theorem 4, we emphasize that the latter holds even
without the SP-RSI conditions.
Second, our results significantly generalize [21, Theorem 2] which itself is a consolidated version of
several earlier works and also shows a linear convergence rate of OGDA under a condition stronger
than our SP-RSI-2 with β = 0 as discussed earlier. More specifically, our results show that linear
convergence rate holds for a much broader set of problems, especially under SP-RSI-1 which was not
discovered before. Furthermore, we also show slower sublinear convergence rates for any value of
β > 0 under either condition, which is also new as far as we know. In particular, we empirically verify
that OGDA indeed does not converge exponentially fast for the toy example defined in Theorem 7
(see Appendix A).
Last but not least, the most significant implication of Theorem 8 is that it provides the by far most
general linear convergence rate for the classic two-player matrix games, or more generally bilinear
games with polytope constraints, according to Theorem 5 and Eq. (8). Compared to recent works
of [8, 10] for matrix games (on OGDA or OMWU), our result is considerably stronger: 1) we do
not require a unique equilibrium while they do; 2) our linear convergence rate holds for any initial
points z0 and ẑ0, while their only holds if the initial points are in a small neighborhood of the unique
equilibrium (otherwise the rate is sublinear); 3) our only requirement on the step size is η ≤ 18L ,
while they require an exponentially small η, which does not reflect the behavior of the algorithms in
practice. In Appendix A, we empirically show that OGDA indeed outperforms OMWU when both
tuned with a constant learning rate.
One may wonder what happens if a bilinear game has a non-polytope constraint. It turns out that
in this case, SP-RSI-1 may only hold with β > 0, due to the following example showing that linear
convergence provably does not hold for OGDA when the feasible set has a curved boundary.
Theorem 9. There exist bilinear games with a non-polytope feasible set such that dist(ẑt,Z) =
Ω(1/t2) holds for OGDA.
This example indicates that the shape of the feasible set plays an important role in last-iterate
convergence, which may be an interesting future direction to investigate, This is also verified
empirically in our experiments (see Appendix A).
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5 Episodic Stochastic Games
In this section, we switch the focus to two-player episodic stochastic games, which can be viewed
as multi-stage matrix games and are often used for modeling multi-agent reinforcement learning
problems. We propose a variant of OGDA for this problem and extend our last-iterate convergence
analysis to this much more challenging setting.
Specifically, a stochastic game is defined by a tuple (S,A,B, `, p0, p,H), where: 1) S is a finite
state space, which is a union of H disjoint layers S1, · · · ,SH ; 2) A and B are finite action space
for Player 1 and Player 2 respectively; 3) ` : S × A × B → [−1, 1] is the loss (payoff) function
for Player 1 (Player 2), with `(s, a, b) specifying how much Player 1 pays to Player 2 if they are
at state s and select actions a and b respectively; 4) p0 ∈ ∆S1 is the initial state distribution; 5)
p : S × A × B → ∆S is the transition function, with p(s′| s, a, b) specifying the probability of
transferring to state s′ after actions a and b are taken by the two players respectively at state s. One
restriction on p is that for any i < H , a, b and s ∈ Si, p(· | s, a, b) is supported on Si+1. In other
words, transition only happens from one layer to the next layer.
We consider a full-information setting (studied in e.g., [34]) where both players know the game
parameters (S,A,B, `, p0, p,H) and interact through T episodes with the goal of either converging
to an equilibrium when cooperating with each other or ensuring low regret otherwise. Specifically,
in each episode t = 1, . . . , T , Player 1 (Player 2) decides her policy xt (yt), which is a collection
of distributions {xst}s∈S ({yst }s∈S) where xst ∈ ∆A (yst ∈ ∆B) is her action distribution at state
s. Then starting from an initial state s ∈ S1 drawn from p0, the two players repeat the following:
sample actions a from xst and b from y
s
t ; Player 1 pays `(s, a, b) to Player 2; if s /∈ SH , then the state
s is updated as a new sample drawn from p(· | s, a, b), otherwise this episode ends. At the end of the
episode, the two players inform each other of their polices xt and yt used in this episode.
According to this protocol, for a fixed policy pair (x, y), it is clear that the expected loss (payoff) of
Player 1 (Player 2) is ρx,y = Es∼p0V sx,y where V sx,y is defined as (with the help of another auxiliary
function Qsx,y):
V sx,y =
∑
a∈A
∑
b∈B
xs(a)ys(b)Qsx,y(a, b) , xs>Qsx,yys,
Qsx,y(a, b) =
{
`(s, a, b) if s ∈ SH ,
`(s, a, b) +
∑
s′ p(s
′ | s, a, b)V s′x,y else.
In words, Qsx,y(a, b) is the expected loss of Player 1 if the two players start from state s, take actions
a and b respectively, and then follow polices x and y for the rest of the episode. Similarly, V sx,y is the
expected loss of Player 1 if the two players start from state s and follow polices x and y. Clearly,
both of them can be computed efficiently via dynamic programming.
Note that ρx,y is non-convex in x and non-concave in y if H > 1. However, due to the layered
structure of the problem, it is clear that an equilibrium (x∗, y∗) for this game is such that for each s ∈
S , (xs∗, ys∗) is an equilibrium for the matrix game with matrixQsx∗,y∗ . For conciseness, we writeQs∗ ,
Qsx∗,y∗ . Further define X s∗ = argminxs maxys xs>Qs∗ys and Ys∗ = argmaxys minxs xs>Qs∗ys,
which are the sets minimax and maximin strategies for the respective player at state s.
5.1 Last-iterate Convergence of Policies
We now present an algorithm so that if both players deploy it, their policies converge to X s∗ and Ys∗
respectively for all state s. Based on previous discussions, a naive approach would be to first find
an approximate equilibrium for all states in the last layer s ∈ SH , using for example OGDA based
on our results in Section 4 since this is a standard matrix game, then similarly find an approximate
equilibrium for all states in the previous layer s ∈ SH−1, since we now have a good approximation
for Qs∗. Repeating this process one can ensure that the entire policy converges to the optimal set. This
is, however, clearly a wasteful and impractical approach.
To improve the efficiency, our idea is basically to learn all the layers simultaneously by running (a
variant of) OGDA at each state with appropriate feedback. Specifically, with notation shorthands
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Qst,τ , Qsxt,yτ , our algorithm update xt and yt in the following way:
x̂st+1 = Π∆A
(
x̂st − ηQst,tyst
)
, (10)
xst+1 = Π∆A
(
x̂st+1 − ηQst+1,tyst
)
, (11)
ŷst+1 = Π∆B
(
ŷst + ηQ
s>
t,t x
s
t
)
, (12)
yst+1 = Π∆B
(
ŷst+1 + ηQ
s>
t,t+1x
s
t
)
, (13)
for each s starting from the last layer back to the first layer. Several remarks on the algorithm are
in order. First, note that in contrast to the version of OGDA described in Section 3.1, here we use
different feedback to update x̂st+1 and x
s
t+1 (similarly ŷ
s
t+1 and y
s
t+1). This is only for a better regret
guarantee described in Section 5.2. For the last-iterate convergence result, changing Qst+1,t and
Qst,t+1 to Q
s
t,t does not matter.
Second, in update rule Eq. (11) (similarly for Eq. (13)), although Qst+1,t depends on xt+1 and thus
the update appears to be recursive, by definition the dependence is only through xs
′
t+1 for s
′ from
layers after s where xs
′
t+1 has already been computed. Therefore, the algorithm is well-defined and
can be implemented efficiently. Also note that to compute xt+1 and yt+1, each player indeed only
needs to know the opponent’s policy (yt and xt respectively) from the last episode.
Finally, while the idea of applying OGDA at each state to deal with a matrix game is natural, the
fact that this matrix Qst,t (or Q
s
t+1,t and Q
s
t,t+1) is actually changing over time introduces extra
complication in the analysis. Fortunately, since the time-varying component is only due to the
changing policy for states after the current layer, if they can be shown to converge, then the change of
the matrix is getting smaller and smaller, making the convergence of the current layer possible as well.
Based on this idea, we prove the following theorem showing the linear last-iterate convergence of our
algorithm. Since at each state the learner faces a matrix game, we define C > 0 to be a constant that
ensures the following for all states and all (xs, ys) and its projection (xs∗, y
s
∗) to the set X s∗ × Ys∗ :
max
x˜s,y˜s
(
xs
>
Qs∗y˜
s − x˜s>Qs∗ys
)
≥ C (‖xs − xs∗‖+ ‖ys − ys∗‖) .
This corresponds to SP-RSI-1, and by the same argument as in Theorem 5, such C always exists.
Theorem 10. With any η ≤ 1
16H
√
2|A||B| , update rules (10)-(13) ensure for all h, t, and s ∈ Sh,
dist (ẑst ,Zs∗) ≤ (1 + C ′)−t+O(
H−h
C′ log
H|A||B|
C′ ),
where ẑst = (x̂
s
t , ŷ
s
t ), Zs∗ = X s∗ × Ys∗ , and C ′ = η
2C2
1000 .
The linear convergence guarantee in Theorem 10 is similar to Eq. (8), except that for layer h, t is
offset by O˜(H−hC′ ), reflecting the fact that the earlier layers converge slightly slower than the later
ones. As far as we know, this is the first last-iterate convergence result for stochastic games.
5.2 Low Regret against Slowly-changing Opponents
Next, we consider a setup where we control the behavior of Player 1, while Player 2 is an arbitrary
opponent. In this case, a standard measure of the performance of Player 1 is her regret, defined as
RegT =
∑T
t=1 ρxt,yt −minx
∑T
t=1 ρx,yt , which is the difference between the expected total loss of
Player 1 and that of the best fixed policy in hindsight. Achieving sublinear regret in general is known
to be at least as hard as agnostic learning of parity functions [40, 34], for which no polynomial-time
algorithm is known. Instead, following [34], we aim to achieve a regret bound in terms of the variation
of the opponent’s policy. Indeed, it is a common situation that the opponent is slowly changing over
time, for example, when the opponent is also applying some relatively stable learning algorithm.
It turns out that, the very same algorithm specified in Eq. (10) and Eq. (11), achieves such a desirable
regret bound already, as we show in the following theorem.
Theorem 11. For any opponent generating policy y1, . . . , yT , the update rules (10) and (11) with
any η > 0 ensure
RegT = O
(
H
η
V1 + ηH4|A|V2
)
,
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where V1 = 1 +
∑T
t=2
∑H
h=1 maxs∈Sh
‖yst − yst−1‖1 and V2 = 1H +
∑T
t=2
∑H
h=1 maxs∈Sh
‖yst − yst−1‖21. In
particular, if there exists α > 0 such that ‖yst − yst−1‖1 = O(T−α) for all t > 1 and s, then tuning
the best step size gives RegT = O(
√
H7|A| · Tmax{1− 32α,0}).
Under the same setting, we are only aware of a recent related work by Radanovic et al. [34] analyzing
an algorithm based on OMWU with some sophisticated tricks, and providing a worse bound of
O(Tmax{1−
3
7α,
1
4}) (ignoring dependence on other parameters) when ‖yst − yst−1‖1 = O(T−α). The
work by Gajane et al. [16] studies a more challenging measure called dynamic regret in a setting with
bandit-feedback, which is not comparable to our result. We emphasize that only our algorithm enjoys
a regret bound and simultaneously a last-iterate convergence guarantee when playing against itself.
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A Experiments1
A.1 Matrix Games on Simplex
Here we provide empirical results on the performance of OGDA for matrix games on simplex. We
set the size of the game matrix to be 32 × 32, then generate a random matrix with each entry Gij
drawn uniformly at random from [−1, 1], and finally rescale its operator norm to 1.
We compare the performances of OGDA with three other algorithms: Gradient Descent Ascent
(GDA), Optimistic Multiplicative Weight Update (OMWU), and Multiplicative Weight Update
(MWU). For all algorithms, we use a constant learning rate η = 18 . We set T = 10
6 and plot curves
for t = 1, 2, . . . , 106. Figure 1 shows the results. The x-axis of both plots represents time step t.
The y-axis of the left plot represents ln(‖ẑt − z?‖), the `2-norm between ẑt and z? after taking the
natural logarithm. On the other hand, the y-axis of the right plot represents the logarithmic duality
gap at each round t, which is
ln(αf (ẑt)) = ln
(
max
j
(G>x̂t)j −min
i
(Gŷt)i
)
.
Note that here we use the limit point of ẑt of OGDA to be z?. This is approximately calculated by
running OGDA much more than T iterations (e.g. 10T iterations). In fact, with probability 1, the
game has a unique Nash Equilibrium [10]. In other words, dist(z,Z∗) = ‖z − z?‖2 with probability
1. We also empirically verify that the iterates of OMWU converge to the same point as OGDA. So
the distance measure we use is a fair comparison.
From Figure 1, we have the following observations. First, considering the convergence to Nash
Equilibrium, the curve of OGDA is a straight line when t > 2×105, supporting the linear convergence
of the distance shown in Theorem 8. Although the curve of OMWU is also decreasing, the rate of its
rate is slower than the one of OGDA. On the other hand, the curves of the other two non-optimistic
algorithms (MWU and GDA) are almost parallel to the x-axis, which means these two algorithms do
not enjoy last-iterate convergence. Second, for the duality gap, the graph is roughly the same as the
one for point-wise convergence. One minor difference for the plot of duality gap is that the curve for
OGDA is slightly oscillating, although it still converges linearly overall.
A.2 Matrix Game on Curved Regions
Next, we do experiments on a bilinear game similar to the one constructed in the proof of Theorem 9.
Specifically, the bilinear game is defined by
f(x, y) = x(2)y(1)− x(1)y(2), X = Y , {(a, b), 0 ≤ a, b ≤ 1, an ≤ b}.
For any positive integer n, the equilibrium point of this game is (0, 0) for both x and y. Note that in
Theorem 9, we prove that OGDA only converges at a rate no better than Ω(1/t2) in this game with
X = Y , {(a, b), 0 ≤ a, b ≤ 12 , a2 ≤ b}.
Figure 2 shows the empirical results for various values of n. In this figure, we plot ‖ẑt − z?‖ versus
the time step t in the log-log scale. Note that in a log-log plot, a straight line with slope s implies a
convergence rate of order O(ts), that is, a sublinear convergence rate. It is clear from Figure 2 that
OGDA indeed converges sublinearly for all n, supporting our Theorem 9.
A.3 Strongly-convex-strongly-concave Games
In this section, we redo the experiments for strongly-convex-strongly-concave games in [26], where
they consider the following case:
f(x, y) = x(1)2 − y(1)2 + 2x(1)y(1), X = Y , {(a, b), 0 ≤ a, b ≤ 1, a+ b = 1}.
The equilibrium point is (0, 1) for both x and y. In Figure 3, we present the log-log plot of ‖ẑt − z?‖
versus time step t and compare OGDA to the other three algorithms as in Appendix A.1. The strictly
concave curve of OGDA implies that the algorithm converges linearly, supporting Theorem 6 and
Theorem 8. Also note that here, OGDA and GDA outperform MWU and OMWU, which is different
from the empirical results shown in [26]. We hypothesize that this is because they use a different
version of OGDA and GDA.
1All source codes can be found at https://github.com/bahh723/OGDA-last-iterate.
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Figure 1: Experiments of different algorithms on a matrix game f(x, y) = x>Gy, where we generate
G ∈ R32×32 with each entry Gij drawn uniformly at random from [−1, 1] and then rescale G’s
operator norm to 1. The left graph shows the point-wise convergence results of MWU, OMWU,
GDA and OGDA. The right graph shows the duality-gap convergence results of MWU, OMWU,
GDA and OGDA. Both graphs show the linear convergence of OGDA.
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Figure 2: Experiments of OGDA on matrix games with curved regions where f(x, y) = x(2)y(1)−
x(1)y(2), X = Y , {(a, b), 0 ≤ a, b ≤ 1, an ≤ b}, and n = 2, 4, 6, 8. This figure is a log-log
plot of ‖ẑt − z?‖ versus t, and it indicates sublinear convergence rates of OGDA in all these games.
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Figure 3: Experiments on a strongly-convex-strongly-concave game where f(x, y) = x(1)2−y(1)2 +
2x(1)y(1),X = Y , {(a, b), 0 ≤ a, b ≤ 1, a+ b = 1}. The figure is a log-log graph of ‖ẑt − z?‖
versus the time step t. The result shows that GDA and OGDA outperform OMWU and MWU in
this case.
13
0 2 4 6 8 10
-4
-3.5
-3
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
Figure 4: Experiments of OGDA on a set of games satisfying SP-RSI-2 with β > 0, where f(x, y) =
x(1)2n−x(1)y(1)−y(1)2n for some integer n ≥ 2 and X = Y , {(a, b), 0 ≤ a, b ≤ 1, a+b = 1}.
The result shows that OGDA converges to the Nash equilibrium with sublinear rates in these instances.
A.4 An Example with β > 0 for SP-RSI-2
We also consider the toy example in Theorem 7, where f(x, y) = x(1)2n − x(1)y(1)− y(1)2n for
some integer n ≥ 2 and X = Y , {(a, b), 0 ≤ a, b ≤ 1, a+ b = 1}. The equilibrium point is (0, 1)
for both x and y. We prove in Theorem 7 that SP-RSI-2 does not hold for β = 0 but does hold for
β = 2n− 2.
The point-wise convergence result is shown in Figure 4, which is again a log-log plot of ‖ẑt − z?‖
versus time step t. One can observe that the convergence rate of OGDA is sublinear, supporting our
theory again.
A.5 Stochastic Games
Finally, we show results for stochastic games. The algorithm we use is the original version of OGDA,
that is, updating Eq. (11) and Eq. (13) with Qst,t instead of Q
s
t+1,t and Q
s
t,t+1. As discussed in
Section 5, for the last-iterate convergence result, this does not matter.
In the following we use [K] to denote {1, 2, . . . ,K} for some positive integer K. In this experiment,
we set H = 4, A = B = [16], and Si = [8] for each i ∈ [H] . To expedite the convergence, we use
η = 18 instead of the learning rate suggested in Theorem 10. Both ` and p are randomly generated.
Specifically, each `(s, a, b) is uniformly at random drawn from [0, 1]. To generate p(s′|s, a, b), we
first choose p′(s′|s, a, b) from [0, 1] uniformly at random, and then normalize it so that p′(·|s, a, b) is
a distribution.
The results are shown in Figure 5. Similar to Appendix A.1, we compare OGDA with MWU,
OMWU, and GDA. Also, we show the convergence of the duality gap and the distance. The duality
gap is defined as
α(ẑt) = α(x̂t, ŷt) = max
y
ρx̂t,y −minx ρx,ŷt , (14)
where ρx,y = Es∼p0V sx,y and p0 is set to be the uniform distribution supported on S1. On the other
hand, the distance is defined as the sum of the distance between ẑst and z
s
? over all states, where z
s
? is
calculated in a similar way as in Appendix A.1. The conclusion of the results is also similar to that in
Appendix A.1, with OGDA outperforming others and enjoying a linear rate.
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Figure 5: Experiments of OGDA and other algorithms on stochastic games. We set H = 4,
A = B = [16], and Si = [8] for each i. Each `(s, a, b) is uniformly drawn from [0, 1] at random. As
for p(s′|s, a, b), we first choose p(s′|s, a, b) from [0, 1] uniformly at random, and normalize them to
form probability distributions. The result of OGDA is compared with MWU, OMWU, and GDA.
Both of the point-wise convergence (left) and the duality gap convergence (right) are presented.
B Proofs of Lemma 2 and Lemma 3
We first provide two auxiliary lemmas.
Lemma 12. Let A be a convex set, and let u′ = ΠA(u− g). Then for any u∗ ∈ A,
2〈u′ − u∗, g〉 ≤ ‖u∗ − u‖2 − ‖u∗ − u′‖2 − ‖u′ − u‖2. (15)
Proof. Since u′ = argminu′∈A ‖u′−u+ g‖2, by the first-order optimality condition for u′, we have
(u′ − u+ g)>(u∗ − u′) ≥ 0.
Note that the right-hand side minus the left-hand side of Eq. (15) is exactly equal to 2(u′ − u +
g)>(u∗ − u′). Thus Eq. (15) holds.
Lemma 13. Let u, u1, u2 ∈ A (a convex set) be related by the following:
u1 = ΠA(u− g1),
u2 = ΠA(u− g2).
Then we have
‖u1 − u2‖ ≤ ‖g1 − g2‖.
Proof. By the first-order optimality conditions of u1 and u2, we have
(u1 − u+ g1) · (u2 − u1) ≥ 0,
(u2 − u+ g2) · (u1 − u2) ≥ 0.
Summing them up and rearranging, we get
−‖u1 − u2‖2 + 〈u2 − u1, g1 − g2〉 ≥ 0.
Rearranging, we get ‖u1−u2‖2 ≤ 〈u2−u1, g1−g2〉 ≤ ‖u1−u2‖‖g1−g2‖. Therefore, ‖u1−u2‖ ≤
‖g1 − g2‖.
Proof of Lemma 2. Considering Eq. (5), and using Lemma 12 with u = ẑt, u′ = ẑt+1, u∗ = z, and
g = ηF (zt), we get
2ηF (zt)
>(ẑt+1 − z) ≤ ‖z − ẑt‖2 − ‖z − ẑt+1‖2 − ‖ẑt+1 − ẑt‖2.
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Considering Eq. (6) (with t replaced with t − 1), and using Lemma 12 with u = ẑt, u′ = zt,
u∗ = ẑt+1, and g = ηF (zt−1), we get
2ηF (zt−1)>(zt − ẑt+1) ≤ ‖ẑt+1 − ẑt‖2 − ‖ẑt+1 − zt‖2 − ‖zt − ẑt‖2.
Summing up the above two inequalities, and adding 2η (F (zt)− F (zt−1))> (zt − ẑt+1) to both
sides, we get
2ηF (zt)
>(zt − z)
≤ ‖z − ẑt‖2 − ‖z − ẑt+1‖2 − ‖ẑt+1 − zt‖2 − ‖zt − ẑt‖2 + 2η (F (zt)− F (zt−1))> (zt − ẑt+1).
(16)
Using Lemma 13 with u = ẑt, u1 = zt, u2 = ẑt+1, g1 = ηF (zt−1) and g2 = ηF (zt), we get
‖zt − ẑt+1‖ ≤ η‖F (zt−1)− F (zt)‖. Therefore,
2η (F (zt)− F (zt−1))> (zt − ẑt+1) ≤ 2η2‖F (zt)− F (zt−1)‖2
≤ 2η2L2‖zt − zt−1‖2 (by the smoothness assumption)
≤ 1
32
‖zt − zt−1‖2. (by our choice of η)
Continuing from Eq. (16),
2ηF (zt)
>(zt − z)
≤ ‖z − ẑt‖2 − ‖z − ẑt+1‖2 − ‖ẑt+1 − zt‖2 − ‖zt − ẑt‖2 + 1
32
‖zt − zt−1‖2
≤ ‖z − ẑt‖2 − ‖z − ẑt+1‖2 − ‖ẑt+1 − zt‖2 − ‖zt − ẑt‖2 + 1
16
‖zt − ẑt‖2 + 1
16
‖ẑt − zt−1‖2
(using (a+ b)2 ≤ 2(a2 + b2))
≤ ‖z − ẑt‖2 − ‖z − ẑt+1‖2 − ‖ẑt+1 − zt‖2 − 15
16
‖zt − ẑt‖2 + 1
16
‖ẑt − zt−1‖2.
This concludes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 3. Below we consider any z′ 6= ẑt+1 ∈ Z . Considering Eq. (5), and using the
first-order optimality condition of ẑt+1, we have
(ẑt+1 − ẑt + ηF (zt))>(z′ − ẑt+1) ≥ 0.
Rearranging it we get
(ẑt+1 − ẑt)>(z′ − ẑt+1) ≥ ηF (zt)>(ẑt+1 − z′)
= ηF (ẑt+1)
>(ẑt+1 − z′) + η (F (zt)− F (ẑt+1))> (ẑt+1 − z′)
≥ ηF (ẑt+1)>(ẑt+1 − z′)− ηL‖zt − ẑt+1‖‖ẑt+1 − z′‖
≥ ηF (ẑt+1)>(ẑt+1 − z′)− 1
8
‖zt − ẑt+1‖‖ẑt+1 − z′‖,
where the third step uses Hölder’s inequality and the smoothness condition, and the last steps uses the
condition η ≤ 1/(8L). Upper bounding the left-hand side by ‖ẑt+1− ẑt‖‖ẑt+1−z′‖ and rearranging,
we get
‖ẑt+1 − z′‖
(
‖ẑt+1 − ẑt‖+ 1
8
‖zt − ẑt+1‖
)
≥ ηF (ẑt+1)>(ẑt+1 − z′),
and thus (
‖ẑt+1 − ẑt‖+ 1
8
‖zt − ẑt+1‖
)2
≥ η
2[F (ẑt+1)
>(ẑt+1 − z′)]2+
‖ẑt+1 − z′‖2
Finally, noticing that(
‖ẑt+1 − ẑt‖+ 1
8
‖zt − ẑt+1‖
)2
≤
(
‖zt − ẑt‖+ 9
8
‖zt − ẑt+1‖
)2
≤
(
9
8
‖zt − ẑt‖+ 9
8
‖zt − ẑt+1‖
)2
≤ 81
32
(‖zt − ẑt‖2 + ‖zt − ẑt+1‖2)
finishes the proof.
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C Proof of Theorem 4
Proof of Theorem 4. By Lemma 2, summing over t (from 1 to T − 1), telescoping, and realizing that
Z has diameter at most 1 according to Assumption 2, we get
T−1∑
t=1
2ηF (zt)
>(zt − z) ≤ 17
16
− 15
16
T−1∑
t=1
(‖ẑt+1 − zt‖2 + ‖zt − ẑt‖2) ,
for any z ∈ Z . In particular, let z be any element from Z∗. Then the left-hand side is lower bounded
by zero since,
F (zt)
>(zt − z) ≥ f(xt, yt)− f(x, yt) + f(xt, y)− f(xt, yt) = f(xt, y)− f(x, yt) ≥ 0 (17)
by convexity/concavity and the optimality of z. Rearranging then leads to
T−1∑
t=1
(‖ẑt+1 − zt‖2 + ‖zt − ẑt‖2) ≤ 17
15
.
On the other hand, by Lemma 3, Lemma 1, and again the bounded diameter of Z , we have
‖ẑt+1 − zt‖2 + ‖zt − ẑt‖2 ≥ 32
81
η2 max
z′∈Z
[
F (ẑt+1)
>(ẑt+1 − z′)
]2
+
‖ẑt+1 − z′‖2 ≥
32η2
81
αf (ẑt+1)
2.
Summing over t from 0 to T − 1 and combining with the earlier upper bound we arrive
at
∑T
t=1 αf (ẑt)
2 = O
(
1/η2
)
. Finally using Cauchy-Schwarz’s inequality
∑T
t=1 αf (ẑt) ≤√
T
√∑T
t=1 αf (ẑt)
2 finishes the proof.
D Proof of Theorem 5
Proof of Theorem 5. Let ρ = minx∈X maxy∈Y x>Gy = maxy∈Y minx∈X x>Gy be the game
value. In this proof, we will prove that there exists some C > 0 such that
max
y′∈Y
x>Gy′ − ρ ≥ C‖x−ΠX∗(x)‖ (18)
for all x ∈ X . Similarly we can prove
max
x′∈X
ρ− x′>Gy ≥ C‖y −ΠY∗(y)‖, (19)
for all y ∈ Y . Then combining the two proves
max
z′
F (z)>(z − z′) = max
y′
x>Gy′ −min
x′
x′>Gy ≥ C (‖y −ΠY∗(y)‖+ ‖x−ΠX∗(x)‖)
≥ C‖z −ΠZ∗(z)‖,
meaning that SP-RSI-1 holds with β = 0.
We break the proof into following several claims.
Claim 1. If X ,Y are polytopes, then X ∗ and Y∗ are also polytopes.
Proof of Claim 1. Note that X ∗ = {x ∈ X : maxy∈Y x>Gy ≤ ρ}. Since Y is a polytope,
the maximum is attained at vertices of Y . Therefore, X ∗ can be equivalently written as{
x ∈ X : maxy∈V(Y) x>Gy ≤ ρ
}
where V(Y) is the set of vertices of Y . Since the constraints
of X ∗ are all linear constraints, X ∗ is a polytope.
With Claim 1, we can without loss of generality write X ∗ as
X ∗ = {x ∈ RM : a>i x ≤ bi, for i = 1, . . . , L, c>i x ≤ di, for i = 1, . . . ,K} ,
where the a>i x ≤ bi constraints come from x ∈ X and the c>i x ≤ di constraints come from
maxy∈V(Y) x>Gy ≤ ρ. Below, we refer to a>i x ≤ bi as the feasibility constraints, and c>i x ≤ di
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as the optimality constraints. In fact, one can identify the i-th optimality constraint as ci = Gy(i)
and di = ρ where y(i) is the i-th vertex of Y . This is based on our construction of X ∗ in the proof of
Claim 1. Therefore, K = |V(Y)|.
Since Eq. (18) clearly holds for x ∈ X ∗, below, we focus on an x ∈ X\X ∗, and let x∗ , ΠX∗(x).
We say a constraint is tight at x∗ if a>i x
∗ = bi or c>i x
∗ = di. Below we assume that there are `
tight feasibility constraints at and k tight optimality constraints at x∗. Without loss of generality, we
assume these tight constraints correspond to i = 1, . . . , ` and i = 1, . . . , k respectively. That is,
a>i x
∗ = bi, for i = 1, . . . , `,
c>i x
∗ = di, for i = 1, . . . , k.
Claim 2. x violates at least one of the tight optimality constraint at x∗.
Proof of Claim 2. We prove this by contradiction. Suppose that x satisfies all k tight optimality
constraints at x∗. Then xmust violates some of the remainingK−k optimality constraints (otherwise
x ∈ X ∗). Assume that it violates constraints K − n+ 1, . . . ,K for some 1 ≤ n ≤ K − k. Thus we
have the following:
c>i x ≤ di for i = 1, . . .K − n;
c>i x > di for i = K − n+ 1, . . . ,K.
Recall that c>i x
∗ ≤ di for i = 1, . . . ,K − n and c>i x∗ < di for all i = K − n + 1, . . . ,K. Thus
there exists some x′ that lies strictly between x and x∗ that makes all constraints hold (notice that x
and x∗ both satisfy all feasibility constraints), which contradicts with ΠX∗(x) = x∗.
Claim 3. maxy′∈Y
(
x>Gy′ − ρ) ≥ maxi∈{1,...,k} c>i (x− x∗).
Proof of Claim 3. Recall that we identify ci with Gy(i) and di = ρ. Therefore,
max
y′∈Y
(
x>Gy′ − ρ) = max
i∈{1,...,|V(Y)|}
(
c>i x− di
) ≥ max
i∈{1,...,k}
(
c>i x− di
)
= max
i∈{1,...,k}
c>i (x− x∗),
where the last equality is because c>i x
∗ = di for i = 1, . . . , k.
Recall from linear programming literature [13, 14] that the normal cone of X ∗ at x∗ can be expressed
as follows:
Nx∗ =
{
x′ − x∗ : x′ ∈ RM , ΠX∗(x′) = x∗
}
=
{∑`
i=1
piai +
k∑
i=1
qici : pi ≥ 0, qi ≥ 0
}
.
The normal cone of X ∗ at x∗ consists of all outgoing normal vectors of X ∗ originated from x∗.
Clearly, x − x∗ belongs to Nx∗ . However, besides the fact that x − x∗ is a normal vector of X ∗,
we also have the additional constraints that x ∈ X . We claim that in our case, x − x∗ lies in the
following smaller cone (which is a subset of Nx∗ ):
Claim 4. x− x∗ belongs to
Mx∗ =
{∑`
i=1
piai +
k∑
i=1
qici : pi ≥ 0, qi ≥ 0, a>j
(∑`
i=1
piai +
k∑
i=1
qici
)
≤ 0, ∀j = 1, . . . , `
}
.
Proof of Claim 4.
As argued above, x− x∗ ∈ Nx∗ and thus x− x∗ can be expressed as
∑`
i=1 piai +
∑k
i=1 qici with
pi ≥ 0, qi ≥ 0. To prove that x− x∗ ∈ Mx∗ , we only need to prove that it satisfies the additional
constraints, that is,
a>i (x− x∗) ≤ 0, ∀i = 1, . . . , `.
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This can be shown by noticing that for all i = 1, . . . , `,
a>i (x− x∗) =
(
a>i x
∗ − bi
)
+ a>i (x− x∗) (the i-th constraint is tight at x∗)
= a>i (x
∗ + x− x∗)− bi
= a>i x− bi ≤ 0. (x ∈ X )
Claim 5. x− x∗ can be written as∑`i=1 piai +∑ki=1 qici with 0 ≤ pi, qi ≤ C ′‖x− x∗‖ for all i
and some problem-dependent constant C ′ <∞.
Proof of Claim 5. Notice that for any x /∈ X ∗, x−x∗‖x−x∗‖ ∈ Mx∗ (because x− x∗ ∈ Mx∗ andMx∗
is a cone). Furthermore, x−x
∗
‖x−x∗‖ ∈ {v ∈ RM : ‖v‖∞ ≤ 1}. Therefore x−x
∗
‖x−x∗‖ ∈Mx∗ ∩ {v ∈ RM :
‖v‖∞ ≤ 1}, which is a bounded subset of the coneMx∗ .
Below we argue that there exists a large enough C ′ > 0 such that{∑`
i=1
piai +
k∑
i=1
qici : 0 ≤ pi, qi ≤ C ′, ∀i
}
⊇ Mx∗ ∩ {v ∈ RM : ‖v‖∞ ≤ 1} , P.
To see this, first note that P is a polytope. For every vertex v̂ of P , the smallest C ′ such that v̂ belongs
to the left-hand side is the solution of the following linear programming:
min
pi,qi,C′v̂
C ′v̂ s.t. v̂ =
∑`
i=1
piai +
k∑
i=1
qici, 0 ≤ pi, qi ≤ C ′v̂.
Since v̂ ∈ Mx∗ , this linear programming is always feasible and admits a finite solution C ′v̂ < ∞.
Now let C ′ = maxv̂∈V(P) C ′v̂ where V(P) is the set of all vertices of P . Then since any v ∈
P can be expressed as a convex combination of points in V(P), v can be also be expressed as∑`
i=1 piai +
∑k
i=1 qici with 0 ≤ pi, qi ≤ C ′.
To sum up, x−x
∗
‖x−x∗‖ can be represented as
∑`
i=1 piai +
∑k
i=1 qici with 0 ≤ pi, qi ≤ C ′. This further
implies that x − x∗ can be represented as ∑`i=1 piai +∑ki=1 qici with 0 ≤ pi, qi ≤ C ′‖x − x∗‖.
Notice that C ′ only depends on the set of tight constraints at x∗.
Finally, we are ready to combine all previous claims and prove the desired inequality.
Define Ai , a>i (x− x∗) and Ci , c>i (x− x∗). By Claim 5, we can write x− x∗ as
∑`
i=1 piai +∑k
i=1 qici with 0 ≤ pi, qi ≤ C ′‖x− x∗‖, and thus,
∑`
i=1
piAi +
k∑
i=1
qiCi =
(∑`
i=1
piai +
k∑
i=1
qici
)>
(x− x∗) = ‖x− x∗‖2.
On the other hand, since x− x∗ ∈Mx∗ by Claim 4, we have∑`
i=1
piAi =
∑`
i=1
pia
>
i (x− x∗) ≤ 0
and
k∑
i=1
qiCi ≤
(
max
i∈{1,...,k}
Ci
) k∑
i=1
qi ≤
(
max
i∈{1,...,k}
Ci
)
kC ′‖x− x∗‖,
where in the first inequality we use the fact pi ≥ 0, and in the second inequality we use the fact
maxi∈{1,...,k} Ci > 0 (by Claim 2) and 0 ≤ qi ≤ kC ′‖x− x∗‖.
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Combining the above three inequalities, we get
max
i∈{1,...,k}
Ci ≥ 1
kC ′
‖x− x∗‖.
Then by Claim 3,
max
y′∈Y
(
x>Gy′ − ρ) ≥ max
i∈{1,...,k}
Ci ≥ 1
kC ′
‖x− x∗‖.
Note that k and C ′ only depend on the set of tight constraints at the projection point x∗, and there
are only finitely many different sets of tight constraints. Therefore, we conclude that there exists
a constant C > 0 such that maxy′∈Y
(
x>Gy′ − ρ) ≥ C‖x − x∗‖ holds for all x and x∗, which
completes the proof.
E Proof of Theorem 6 and Theorem 7
Proof of Theorem 6. Suppose that f is γ-strongly-convex in x, and γ-strongly-concave in y, and let
(x∗, y∗) ∈ Z∗. Then for any (x, y) we have
f(x, y)− f(x∗, y) ≤ ∇xf(x, y)>(x− x∗)− γ
2
‖x− x∗‖2,
f(x, y∗)− f(x, y) ≤ ∇yf(x, y)>(y∗ − y)− γ
2
‖y − y∗‖2.
Summing up the two inequalities, and noticing that f(x, y∗)− f(x∗, y) ≥ 0 for any (x∗, y∗) ∈ Z∗,
we get
F (z)>(z − z∗) ≥ γ
2
‖z − z∗‖2,
which implies SP-RSI-2 with β = 0 and C = γ/2.
Proof of Theorem 7. First, we show that f has a unique Nash Equilibrium z∗ = (x∗, y∗) =
((0, 1), (0, 1)). First, as f is a strictly monotone decreasing function with respect to y(1), we must
have y∗(1) = 0 and y∗(2) = 1. In addition, if x = (0, 1), maxy∈Y f(x, y) = −miny∈Y y(1)2n = 0.
If x 6= (0, 1), then by choosing y∗ = (0, 1), f(x, y∗) = x(1)2n > 0. Therefore, we have x∗ = (0, 1),
which proves that the unique Nash Equilibrium is x∗ = (0, 1), y∗ = (0, 1).
Second, we show that f satisfies SP-RSI-2 with β = 2n− 2. In fact, for any z = (x, y), we have
F (z)>(z − z∗) =
2nx(1)
2n−1 − y(1)
0
2ny(1)2n−1 + x(1)
0

>  x(1)x(2)− 1y(1)
y(2)− 1

= 2n
(
x(1)2n + y(1)2n
)
≥ 4n ·
(
x(1)2 + y(1)2
2
)n
(Jensen’s inequality)
=
n
2n−2
(
x(1)2 + y(1)2
)n
.
Note that ‖z − z∗‖ = √x(1)2 + (1− x(2))2 + y(1)2 + (1− y(2))2 = √2x(1)2 + 2y(1)2. There-
fore, we have F (z)>(z − z∗) ≥ n22n−2 ‖z − z∗‖2n. This shows that f satisfies SP-RSI-2 with
β = 2n− 2 and C = n22n−2 . Clearly, the same cannot always hold true for β = 0.
F Proof of Theorem 8
Proof of Theorem 8. We use Lemma 2, and simplify the notations with Ωt , dist(ẑt,Z∗) =
‖ΠZ∗(ẑt) − ẑt‖2, Ω′t+1 , ‖ΠZ∗(ẑt) − ẑt+1‖2, and θt = 116‖ẑt − zt−1‖2. By the definition of
projection, we have Ωt+1 ≤ Ω′t+1.
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Notice that for any z ∈ Z∗, F (zt)>(zt − z) ≥ 0 (see Eq. (17)), so by Lemma 2 we have
Ωt+1 ≤ Ω′t+1
≤ Ωt − ‖ẑt+1 − zt‖2 − 15
16
‖zt − ẑt‖2 + 1
16
‖ẑt − zt−1‖2
= Ωt − 1
2
(‖ẑt+1 − zt‖2 + ‖zt − ẑt‖2)− 1
2
‖ẑt+1 − zt‖2 − 7
16
‖zt − ẑt‖2 + 1
16
‖ẑt − zt−1‖2
≤ Ωt − 1
2
(‖ẑt+1 − zt‖2 + ‖zt − ẑt‖2)− 8θt+1 + θt. (20)
Case 1. SP-RSI-1. In this case, we apply Lemma 3 with the fact ‖ẑt+1 − z′‖ ≤ 1 for any z′ ∈ Z
to arrive at
‖ẑt+1 − zt‖2 + ‖zt − ẑt‖2 ≥ 32η
2
81
max
z′∈Z
[
F (ẑt+1)
>(ẑt+1 − z′)
]2
+
≥ 32η
2C2
81
‖ẑt+1 −ΠZ∗(ẑt+1)‖2(β+1) = 32η
2C2
81
Ωβ+1t+1 ,
where in the second line we use the definition of SP-RSI-1. Combining this with Eq. (20), we get
Ωt+1 + 8θt+1 ≤ Ωt − 16η
2C2
81
Ωβ+1t+1 + θt ≤ Ωt − C ′Ωβ+1t+1 + θt, (21)
where C ′ = 16η
2 min{C2,L2}
81(β+1)·2β ≤ 1 is defined in the statement of the theorem. Eq. (21) is of the form
specified in Lemma 14 and Lemma 15 for the case of β = 0 and β > 0 respectively. Therefore, when
β = 0, we apply Lemma 14 with q = C ′, proving Eq. (8); and when β > 0, we apply Lemma 15
with p = β, q = C ′ and note that the required condition C ′(β + 1)2β ≤ 1 is satisfied, proving Eq.
(9).
Case 2. SP-RSI-2. In this case, if ẑt+1 /∈ Z∗, we apply Lemma 3 with z′ = ΠZ∗(ẑt+1) 6= ẑt+1
and get
‖ẑt+1 − zt‖2 + ‖zt − ẑt‖2 ≥ 32η
2
81
[
F (ẑt+1)
>(ẑt+1 −ΠZ∗(ẑt+1))
]2
+
‖ẑt+1 −ΠZ∗(ẑt+1)‖2
≥ 32η
2
81
C2Ωβ+2t+1
Ωt+1
=
32η2C2
81
Ωβ+1t+1 ,
where the second step uses the definition of SP-RSI-2. Note that this also trivially holds when
ẑt+1 ∈ Z∗ since in this case Ωt+1 = 0. We have thus arrived at the exact same bound as in Case 1,
and the rest of the proof is identical.
Lemma 14. Consider non-negative sequences {At} and {θt} that satisfy At+1 + 8θt+1 ≤ At −
qAt+1 + θt, At ≤ 1, θt ≤ 116 for all t ≥ 1 and some 0 < q ≤ 1. Then we have
At ≤ 3
(
1
1 + q
)t
.
Proof. Rearranging the recursion formula we get
At+1 +
8
1 + q
θt+1 ≤ 1
1 + q
At +
1
1 + q
θt ≤ 1
1 + q
(
At +
8
1 + q
θt
)
,
where we use 11+q ≤ 8(1+q)2 because 0 < q ≤ 1. By induction we can prove thatAt ≤ At+ 81+q θt ≤(
1
1+q
)t−1 (
A1 +
8
1+q θ1
)
≤ 3
(
1
1+q
)t
.
Lemma 15. Consider non-negative sequences {At} and {θt} that satisfy At+1 + 8θt+1 ≤ At −
qAp+1t+1 + θt, At ≤ 1, θt ≤ 116 for all t ≥ 1 and some p > 0, 0 < q ≤ 1 such that q(1 + p)2p ≤ 1.
Then we have
At ≤
(
2 +
(
2
qp
) 1
p
)
t−
1
p .
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Proof. We will invoke the following formula that is given by the fundamental theorem of calculus:
for a ≥ b ≥ 0,
ap+1 − bp+1 =
∫ a
b
(
d
dx
xp+1
)
dx = (p+ 1)
∫ a
b
xpdx ≤ (p+ 1)(a− b)ap. (22)
Using it, we have
(At + 4θt)
p+1 −Ap+1t ≤ 4(1 + p)θt(At + 4θt)p ≤ (p+ 1)θt2p+2.
Therefore, using the recursion condition and q(1 + p)2p ≤ 1 implies
At+1 + 8θt+1 ≤ At − qAp+1t+1 + θt
≤ At − q(At+1 + 4θt+1)p+1 + q(1 + p)2p+2θt+1 + θt
≤ At − q(At+1 + 4θt+1)p+1 + 4θt+1 + θt,
which further gives
At+1 + 4θt+1 ≤ At + 4θt − q(At+1 + 4θt+1)p+1.
Below we define Bt = At + 4θt such that Bt+1 ≤ Bt − qBp+1t+1 . Next we will prove Bt+1 ≤
Bt − q2Bp+1t by considering the following two cases.
Case 1. Bt+1 ≥ Bt. In this case, clearly we have
Bt+1 ≤ Bt − qBp+1t+1 ≤ Bt − qBp+1t ≤ Bt −
q
2
Bp+1t .
Case 2. Bt+1 ≤ Bt. In this case, we use Eq. (22) and get
Bt+1 ≤ Bt − qBp+1t+1 ≤ Bt − qBp+1t + q(p+ 1) (Bt −Bt+1)Bpt .
By rearranging, we get
Bt+1 ≤
(
1− qB
p
t
1 + q(1 + p)Bpt
)
Bt.
Using the fact q(1 + p)Bpt ≤ q(p + 1)2p, which is at most 1 by the condition of the lemma, we
further get
Bt+1 ≤
(
1− qB
p
t
2
)
Bt.
Combining the two cases we have shown Bt+1 ≤ Bt − q2Bp+1t . Below we use induction to
prove Bt ≤ ct− 1p where c = max
{
2,
(
2
qp
) 1
p
}
. When t = 1, we have B1 ≤ 2 ≤ c. Suppose
that it holds for 1, . . . , t. Note that the function f(Bt) =
(
1− q2Bpt
)
Bt is increasing in Bt as
f ′(Bt) = 1− q(p+1)2 Bpt ≥ 0 by the condition q(p+ 1)2p ≤ 1 and the fact Bt ≤ 2. Therefore, we
apply the induction hypothesis and get
Bt+1 ≤
(
1− q
2
Bpt
)
Bt
≤
(
1− q
2
cpt−1
)
ct−
1
p
= ct−
1
p − q
2
cp+1t−1−
1
p
≤ ct− 1p − c
p
t−1−
1
p ( cp ≤ q2cp+1 by the definition of c)
≤ c(t+ 1)− 1p ,
where the last inequality is by the fundamental theorem of calculus:
t−
1
p − (1 + t)− 1p =
∫ t
1+t
(
d
dx
x−
1
p
)
dx =
∫ t
1+t
(
−1
p
)
x−1−
1
p dx
=
∫ t+1
t
1
p
x−1−
1
p dx ≤ 1
p
t−1−
1
p .
Since Bt is an upper bound of At, we have also obtained the same upper bound for At, completing
the proof.
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G Proof of Theorem 9
Proof of Theorem 9. Consider the following 2× 2 bilinear game with curved feasible sets (we use
x(i) to denote the i-th coordinate of x):
f(x, y) = x>Gy = [x(1) x(2)]
[
0 −1
1 0
] [
y(1)
y(2)
]
X =
{
x : 0 ≤ x(1) ≤ 1
2
, 0 ≤ x(2) ≤ 1
4
, x(2) ≥ x(1)2
}
,
Y =
{
y : 0 ≤ y(1) ≤ 1
2
, 0 ≤ y(2) ≤ 1
4
, y(2) ≥ y(1)2
}
.
Below, we use Claim 1 - Claim 4 to argue that if the two players start from x0 = y0 = x̂0 = ŷ0 =
( 12 ,
1
4 ), and use any constant learning rate η ≤ 164 , then the convergence is sublinear in the sense that‖ẑt − z∗‖ ≥ Ω(1/t).
Claim 1. The unique equilibrium is x∗ = 0, y∗ = 0.
When x = 0, clearly maxy′∈Y f(x, y′) = 0. Below we prove that if x 6= 0, then maxy′∈Y f(x, y′) >
0. If x(1) 6= 0, we let y′(1) = 12x(1) and y′(2) = 14x(1)2 (which satisfies y′ ∈ Y), and thus
f(x, y′) = x(2)y′(1)− x(1)y′(2) = x(1)2 · 1
2
x(1)− x(1) · 1
4
x(1)2 =
1
4
x(1)3 > 0.
If x(1) = 0 but x(2) 6= 0, we let y′(1) = 12 , y′(2) = 14 , and thus
f(x, y′) = x(2)y′(1)− x(1)y′(2) = 1
2
x(2) > 0.
Thus maxy′∈Y f(x, y′) > 0 if x 6= 0 and thus x∗ = 0 is the unique optimal solution for x. By the
symmetry between x and y (because G = −G>), we can also prove that the unique optimal solution
for y is y∗ = 0.
Claim 2. Suppose that x0 = y0 = x̂0 = ŷ0 = ( 12 ,
1
4 ). Then, at any step t ∈ [T ], we have xt = yt
and x̂t = ŷt and all xt, yt, x̂t, ŷt belong to {u ∈ R2 : u(2) = u(1)2}.
We prove this by induction. The base case trivially holds. Suppose that for step t, we have xt = yt
and x̂t = ŷt and xt, yt, x̂t, ŷt ∈ {u ∈ R2 : u(2) = u(1)2}. Then consider step t+ 1. According to
the dynamic of OGDA, we have
x̂t+1 = ΠX
{
x̂t − η
[−yt(2)
yt(1)
]}
= ΠX
{[
x̂t(1) + ηyt(2)
x̂t(2)− ηyt(1)
]}
, (23)
xt+1 = ΠX
{
x̂t+1 − η
[−yt(2)
yt(1)
]}
= ΠX
{[
x̂t+1(1) + ηyt(2),
x̂t+1(2)− ηyt(1)
]}
, (24)
ŷt+1 = ΠY
{
ŷt + η
[
xt(2)
−xt(1)
]}
= ΠY
{[
ŷt(1) + ηxt(2)
ŷt(2)− ηxt(1)
]}
, (25)
yt+1 = ΠY
{
ŷt+1 + η
[
xt(2)
−xt(1)
]}
= ΠY
{[
ŷt+1(1) + ηxt(2)
ŷt+1(2)− ηxt(1)
]}
. (26)
According to induction hypothesis, we have x̂t+1 = ŷt+1, which further leads to xt+1 = yt+1.
Now we prove that for any
[
x(1)
x(2)
]
such that x(1) ≥ 0, x(2) ≤ 14 and x(2) < x(1)2,
[
x(1)
x(2)
]
=
ΠX
{[
x(1)
x(2)
]}
satisfies that x(1)2 = x(2). Otherwise, suppose that x(1)2 < x(2). Then according
to the intermediate value theorem, there exists
[
x˜(1)
x˜(2)
]
that lies in the line segment of
[
x(1)
x(2)
]
and
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[
x(1)
x(2)
]
such that x˜(1)2 = x˜(2). Moreover, as x(1) ≥ 0, x˜(1) ≥ 0, x(2) ≤ 14 , x˜(2) ≤ 14 , we know
that
[
x˜(1)
x˜(2)
]
∈ X . Therefore, we have ‖x˜− x‖ < ‖x− x‖, which leads to contradiction.
Now consider x̂t+1. According to induction hypothesis, we have (x̂t(1) + ηyt(2))2 ≥ x̂t(1)2 =
x̂t(2) ≥ x̂t(2)− ηyt(1). If equalities hold, trivially we have x̂t+1(1)2 = x̂t(1)2 = x̂t(2) = x̂t+1(2)
according to Eq. (23). Otherwise, as x̂t(1) + ηyt(2) ≥ 0, x̂t(2)− ηyt(1) ≤ 14 , according to above
analysis, we also have x̂t+1(1)2 = x̂t+1(2). Applying similar analysis to ŷt+1, xt+1 and yt+1
finishes the induction proof.
Claim 3. With η ≤ 164 , the following holds for all t ≥ 1,
xt(1) ∈
[
1
2
x̂t(1), 2x̂t(1)
]
, (27)
x̂t(1) ∈
[
x̂t−1(1)− 4ηx̂t−1(1)2, x̂t−1(1) + 4ηx̂t−1(1)2
]
. (28)
We prove the claim by induction on t. The case t = 1 trivially holds. Suppose that Eq. (27) and Eq.
(28) hold at step t. Now consider step t+ 1.
Induction to get Eq. (28). According to Claim 2, we have
x̂t+1 = ΠX
{
x̂t − η
[−yt(2)
yt(1)
]}
= ΠX
{[
x̂t(1) + ηxt(1)
2
x̂t(1)
2 − ηxt(1)
]}
, (29)
and x̂t+1 = (u, u2) for some u ∈ [0, 1/2]. Using the definition of the projection function, we have
x̂t+1(1) = argmin
u∈[0, 12 ]
{(
x̂t(1) + ηxt(1)
2 − u)2 + (x̂t(1)2 − ηxt(1)− u2)2} , argmin
u∈[0, 12 ]
g(u).
Now we show that argminu∈[0, 12 ] g(u) = argminu∈R g(u). Note that
∇g(u) = 2(u− x̂t(1)− ηxt(1)2) + 4u
(
u2 + ηxt(1)− x̂t(1)2
)
, (30)
Therefore, when u > 12 , using xt(1) ≤ 12 , we have
∇g(u) > −2ηxt(1)2 + 2ηxt(1) ≥ 0, (31)
which means g(u) > g( 12 ). On the other hand, when u < 0, using x̂t(1) ≤ 12 , we have
∇g(u) < 2u− 4ux̂t(1)2 ≤ u < 0, (32)
which means g(u) > g(0). Combining Eq. (31) and Eq. (32), we know that argminu∈[0, 12 ] g(u) =
argminu∈R g(u). Therefore, x̂t+1(1) is the unconstrained minimizer of convex function g(u), which
means∇g(x̂t+1(1)) = 0. Below we use contradiction to prove that x̂t+1(1) ≥ x̂t(1)− 4ηx̂t(1)2. If
x̂t+1(1) < x̂t(1)− 4ηx̂t(1)2, we use Eq. (30) and get
∇g(x̂t+1(1)) = 2(x̂t+1(1)− x̂t(1)− ηxt(1)2) + 4x̂t+1(1)
(
x̂t+1(1)
2 + ηxt(1)− x̂t(1)2
)
< 2(−4ηx̂t(1)2 − ηxt(1)2) + 4x̂t+1(1)
(
ηxt(1)− 8ηx̂t(1)3 + 16η2x̂t(1)4
)
≤ −17
2
ηx̂t(1)
2 + 4x̂t+1(1)
(
2ηx̂t(1)− 8ηx̂t(1)3 + 16η2x̂t(1)4
)
(Eq. (27))
≤ −17
2
ηx̂t(1)
2 + 4x̂t+1(1)
(
2ηx̂t(1) + 16η
2x̂t(1)
4
)
≤ −17
2
ηx̂t(1)
2 + 4(x̂t(1)− 4ηx̂t(1)2)
(
2ηx̂t(1) + 16η
2x̂t(1)
4
)
(x̂t+1(1) < x̂t(1)− 4ηx̂t(1)2)
= −1
2
ηx̂t(1)
2 + 64η2x̂t(1)
5 − 32η2x̂t(1)3 − 256η3x̂t(1)6
≤ −1
2
ηx̂t(1)
2 − 16η2x̂t(1)3 − 256η3x̂t(1)6 (x̂t(1) ≤ 12 )
≤ 0,
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which leads to contradiction. Similarly, if x̂t+1(1) > x̂t(1) + 4ηx̂t(1)2, we have
∇g(x̂t+1(1)) = 2(x̂t+1(1)− x̂t(1)− ηxt(1)2) + 4x̂t+1(1)
(
x̂t+1(1)
2 + ηxt(1)− x̂t(1)2
)
> 2(4ηx̂t(1)
2 − ηxt(1)2) + 4x̂t+1(1)
(
ηxt(1) + 8ηx̂t(1)
3 + 16η2x̂t(1)
4
)
≥ 0. (Eq. (27))
The above calculations conclude that
x̂t+1(1) ∈
[
x̂t(1)− 4ηx̂t(1)2, x̂t(1) + 4ηx̂t(1)2
]
. (33)
Induction to get Eq. (27). Similarly, we have
xt+1(1) = argmin
u∈[0, 12 ]
{(
x̂t+1(1) + ηxt(1)
2 − u)2 + (x̂t+1(1)2 − ηxt(1)− u2)2} , argmin
u∈[0, 12 ]
h(u),
and
∇h(u) = 2(u− x̂t+1(1)− ηxt(1)2) + 4u(u2 + ηxt(1)− x̂t+1(1)2),
and ∇h(xt+1(1)) = 0. If xt+1(1) < 12 x̂t+1(1), we have
∇h(xt+1(1)) = 2(xt+1(1)− x̂t+1(1)− ηxt(1)2) + 4xt+1(1)
(
xt+1(1)
2 + ηxt(1)− x̂t+1(1)2
)
< −x̂t+1(1)− 2ηxt(1)2 − 3xt+1(1)x̂t+1(1)2 + 2ηx̂t+1(1)xt(1)
(xt+1(1) < 12 x̂t+1(1))
≤ 0. (η ≤ 164 , xt(1) ≤ 12 )
If xt+1(1) > 2x̂t+1(1), we also have
∇h(xt+1(1)) = 2(xt+1(1)− x̂t+1(1)− ηxt(1)2) + 4xt+1(1)
(
xt+1(1)
2 + ηxt(1)− x̂t+1(1)2
)
> 2x̂t+1(1)− 2ηxt(1)2 + 24x̂t+1(1)3 + 8ηx̂t+1(1)xt(1) (xt+1(1) > 2x̂t+1(1))
≥ 2x̂t+1(1)− 2ηxt(1)2 + 24x̂t+1(1)3 + 8η(x̂t(1)− 4ηx̂t(1)2)xt(1) (Eq. (33))
≥ 2x̂t+1(1)− 2ηxt(1)2 + 24x̂t+1(1)3 + 8η(1
2
xt(1)− 4ηx̂t(1)2)xt(1) (Eq. (27))
= 2x̂t+1(1) + 2ηxt(1)
2 + 24x̂t+1(1)
3 − 32η2x̂t(1)2xt(1)
≥ 2x̂t+1(1) + 1
4
ηx̂t(1)
2 + 24x̂t+1(1)
3 − 32η2x̂t(1)2xt(1) (Eq. (27))
≥ 0. (η ≤ 164 , xt(1) ≤ 12 )
Both lead to contradiction. Therefore, we conclude that xt+1 ∈ [ 12 x̂t+1(1), 2x̂t+1(1)], which finishes
the induction proof.
Claim 4. If η ≤ 164 , we have ‖ẑt − z∗‖ ≥ Ω(1/t).
Now we are ready to prove ‖ẑt− z∗‖ ≥ Ω(1/t). First we show x̂t(1) ≥ 12t for all t ≥ 1 by induction.
The case t = 1 trivially holds. Suppose that it holds at step t. Considering step t+ 1, we have
x̂t+1(1) ≥ x̂t(1)− 4ηx̂t(1)2 (Claim 3)
≥ x̂t(1)− 1
16
x̂t(1)
2 (η ≤ 164 )
≥ 1
2t
− 1
64t2
( 12t ≤ x̂t(1) ≤ 12 and function x− 116x2 is increasing when x ≤ 8)
≥ 1
2(t+ 1)
. (t ≥ 1)
Note that according to Claim 1, x∗ = 0. Therefore, we have ‖ẑt − z∗‖ ≥ x̂t+1(1) ≥ 12t , which
finishes the proof.
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H Auxiliary Lemmas for Stochastic Games
Definition 2. Define µsx,y as the probability of visiting state s given that the players use policies
(x, y). By the game structure, it satisfies the following:
µs
′
x,y =
{
p0(s
′) if s′ ∈ S1,∑
s∈S
∑
a,b x
s(a)ys(b)p(s′ | s, a, b)µsx,y if s′ /∈ S1.
Also,
∑
s∈Sh µ
s
x,y = 1 for any h, x, y.
Lemma 16 (Value difference lemma). For any policies x, y, x˜, y˜, we have
ρx,y − ρx˜,y˜ =
∑
s∈S
∑
a,b
µsx˜,y˜
(
xs(a)ys(b)− x˜s(a)y˜s(b)
)
Qsx,y(a, b).
Proof. By definitions, we have the following equalities:
ρx˜,y˜ =
∑
s∈S
∑
a,b
µsx˜,y˜x˜
s(a)y˜s(b)`(s, a, b)
=
∑
s∈S
∑
a,b
µsx˜,y˜x˜
s(a)y˜s(b)
(
Qsx,y(a, b)−
∑
s′∈S
p(s′ | s, a, b)V s′x,y
)
(by the definition of Qsx,y)
=
∑
s∈S
∑
a,b
µsx˜,y˜x˜
s(a)y˜s(b)Qsx,y(a, b)−
∑
s′∈S\S1
µs
′
x˜,y˜V
s′
x,y (by Definition 2)
=
∑
s∈S
∑
a,b
µsx˜,y˜x˜
s(a)y˜s(b)Qsx,y(a, b)−
∑
s∈S
µsx˜,y˜V
s
x,y +
∑
s∈S1
µsx˜,y˜V
s
x,y
=
∑
s∈S
∑
a,b
µsx˜,y˜
(
x˜s(a)y˜s(b)− xs(a)ys(b)
)
Qsx,y(a, b) +
∑
s∈S1
p0(s)V
s
x,y
(by the definition of V sx,y)
=
∑
s∈S
∑
a,b
µsx˜,y˜
(
x˜s(a)y˜s(b)− xs(a)ys(b)
)
Qsx,y(a, b) + ρx,y.
Rearranging the above finishes the proof.
Lemma 17. Let s ∈ Sh for some h. Then for any actions a, b and any policies x, y, x˜, y˜, we have
∣∣Qsx˜,y˜(a, b)−Qsx,y(a, b)∣∣ ≤ H
(
H∑
i=h+1
max
s′∈Si
‖x˜s′ − xs′‖1 + ‖y˜s′ − ys′‖1
)
.
Proof. Notice that for s ∈ Si, by definition we have∣∣Qsx˜,y˜(a, b)−Qsx,y(a, b)∣∣ ≤∑
s′
p(s′ | s, a, b)
∣∣∣V s′x˜,y˜ − V s′x,y∣∣∣
≤ max
s′∈Si+1
∣∣∣V s′x˜,y˜ − V s′x,y∣∣∣
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and ∣∣V sx˜,y˜ − V sx,y∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
a,b
x˜s(a)y˜s(b)Qsx˜,y˜(a, b)−
∑
a,b
xs(a)ys(b)Qsx,y(a, b)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
a,b
∣∣x˜s(a)y˜s(b)Qsx˜,y˜(a, b)− xs(a)ys(b)Qsx,y(a, b)∣∣
≤
∑
a,b
|x˜s(a)− xs(a)| y˜s(b)Qsx˜,y˜(a, b)
+
∑
a,b
xs(a) |y˜s(b)− ys(b)|Qsx˜,y˜(a, b)
+
∑
a,b
xs(a)ys(b)
∣∣Qsx˜,y˜(a, b)−Qsx,y(a, b)∣∣
≤ H‖x˜s − xs‖1 +H‖y˜s − ys‖1 +
∑
a,b
xs(a)ys(b)
∣∣Qsx˜,y˜(a, b)−Qsx,y(a, b)∣∣
≤ H‖x˜s − xs‖1 +H‖y˜s − ys‖1 + max
a,b
∣∣Qsx˜,y˜(a, b)−Qsx,y(a, b)∣∣ ,
where in the second to last step we use the fact that Qsx,y(a, b) is at most H clearly. Using the above
two relations repeatedly for i = h, h+ 1, . . . ,H − 1 proves the result.
Corollary 18. For any y′ ∈ ∆B, s ∈ Sh for some h, z = (x, y), and z˜ = (x˜, y˜), we have
‖(Qsx,y −Qsx˜,y˜)y′‖∞ ≤ H2
√
A+B max
i>h,s′∈Si
‖z˜s′ − zs′‖,
‖(Qsx,y −Qsx˜,y)y′‖∞ ≤ H2
√
A max
i>h,s′∈Si
‖x˜s′ − xs′‖,
‖(Qsx,y −Qsx,y˜)y′‖∞ ≤ H2
√
B max
i>h,s′∈Si
‖y˜s′ − ys′‖,
where A = |A|, B = |B| and ‖ · ‖ is 2-norm.
Proof. The first inequality can be shown by the following:
‖(Qsx,y −Qsx˜,y˜)y′‖∞
= max
i
∣∣e>i (Qsx,y −Qsx˜,y˜)y′∣∣
= max
i
∥∥e>i (Qsx,y −Qsx˜,y˜)∥∥∞ ‖y′‖1
≤ H
(
H∑
i=h+1
max
s′∈Si
‖x˜s′ − xs′‖1 + ‖y˜s′ − ys′‖1
)
(by Lemma 17)
≤ H2 max
i>h,s′∈Si
√
A‖x˜s′ − xs′‖+
√
B‖y˜s′ − ys′‖
≤ H2√A+B max
i>h,s′∈Si
‖z˜s′ − zs′‖. (Cauchy-Schwarz inequality)
The other two inequalities can be obtained similarly.
Lemma 19. For any h and any polices x, y, x˜, y˜, we have
∑
s′∈Sh
∣∣∣µs′x˜,y˜ − µs′x,y∣∣∣ ≤ h−1∑
i=1
(
max
s∈Si
‖x˜s − xs‖1 + max
s∈Si
‖y˜s − ys‖1
)
.
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Proof. By Definition 2, we proceed with∑
s′∈Sh
∣∣∣µs′x˜,y˜ − µs′x,y∣∣∣
=
∑
s′∈Sh
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
s∈Sh−1
∑
a,b
(
x˜s(a)y˜s(b)p(s′ | s, a, b)µsx˜,y˜ − xs(a)ys(b)p(s′ | s, a, b)µsx,y
)∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
s∈Sh−1
∑
a,b
( ∑
s′∈Sh
p(s′ | s, a, b)
)∣∣(x˜s(a)y˜s(b)µsx˜,y˜ − xs(a)ys(b)µsx,y)∣∣
=
∑
s∈Sh−1
∑
a,b
∣∣x˜s(a)y˜s(b)µsx˜,y˜ − xs(a)ys(b)µsx,y∣∣
≤
∑
s∈Sh−1
∑
a,b
|x˜s(a)− xs(a)| y˜s(b)µsx˜,y˜ +
∑
s∈Sh−1
∑
a,b
xs(a) |y˜s(b)− ys(b)|µsx˜,y˜
+
∑
s∈Sh−1
∑
a,b
xs(a)ys(b)
∣∣µsx˜,y˜ − µsx,y∣∣
≤ max
s∈Sh−1
‖x˜s − xs‖1 + max
s∈Sh−1
‖y˜s − ys‖1 +
∑
s∈Sh−1
∣∣µsx˜,y˜ − µsx,y∣∣ .
Applying the above inequality repeatedly finishes the proof.
I Proofs of Theorem 10
We follow our convention that zs , (xs, ys). Also, we define the following notation:
Definition 3. Define Φt,h = maxi≥h maxs∈Si ‖zst − zs∗‖2.
Lemma 20. For any s ∈ Sh and any z˜s = (x˜s, y˜s) such that
(
x̂s
>
t+1Q
s
∗y˜
s − x˜s>Qs∗ŷst+1
)
> 0, we
have
‖zst − ẑst ‖2 + ‖ẑst+1 − zst ‖2 ≥
64
1875
η2
(
x̂s
>
t+1Q
s
∗y˜
s − x˜s>Qs∗ŷst+1
)2
−H2Φt,h+1.
Proof. The proof follows similar arguments of the proof of Lemma 3. By the optimality of x̂st+1 we
have for any x˜s,
(x̂st+1 − x̂st + ηQst,tyst )>(x˜s − x̂st+1) ≥ 0.
Rearranging, we get
(x̂st+1 − x̂st )>(x˜s − x̂st+1) ≥ η(x̂st+1 − x˜s)Qst,tyst . (34)
Because ‖x˜s− x̂st+1‖ ≤ 2, for the left-hand side we have (x̂st+1− x̂st )>(x˜s− x̂st+1) ≤ 2‖x̂st+1− x̂st‖.
For the right-hand side, we have
η(x̂st+1 − x˜s)>Qst,tyst
= η(x̂st+1 − x˜s)>Qs∗ŷst+1 + η(x̂st+1 − x˜s)>(Qst,t −Qs∗)ŷst+1 + η(x̂st+1 − x˜s)>Qst,t(yst − ŷst+1)
≥ η(x̂st+1 − x˜s)>Qs∗ŷst+1 − η‖x̂st+1 − x˜s‖1‖(Qst,t −Qs∗)ŷst+1‖∞ − η‖x̂st+1 − x˜s‖1‖Qst,t(yst − ŷst+1)‖∞
≥ η(x̂st+1 − x˜s)>Qs∗ŷst+1 − 2ηH2
√
A+B
√
Φt,h+1 − 2ηH‖yst − ŷst+1‖1 (using Corollary 18)
≥ η(x̂st+1 − x˜s)>Qs∗ŷst+1 − 2ηH2
√
A+B
√
Φt,h+1 − 2ηH
√
B‖yst − ŷst+1‖.
Therefore, with Eq. (34), we have
2‖x̂st+1 − x̂st‖+ 2ηH2
√
A+B
√
Φt,h+1 + 2ηH
√
B‖yst − ŷst+1‖
≥ η(x̂st+1 − x˜s)>Qs∗ŷst+1.
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Similarly for y we can obtain
2‖ŷst+1 − ŷst ‖+ 2ηH2
√
A+B
√
Φt,h+1 + 2ηH
√
A‖xst − x̂st+1‖
≥ ηx̂s>t+1Qs∗(y˜s − ŷst+1).
Summing up these two inequalities we get
η
(
x̂s
>
t+1Q
s
∗y˜
s − x˜s>Qs∗ŷst+1
)
≤ 2
√
2‖ẑst+1 − ẑst ‖+ 2ηH
√
2AB‖zst − ẑst+1‖+ 4ηH2
√
A+B
√
Φt,h+1
(Cauchy-Schwarz inequality)
≤ 3‖ẑst+1 − ẑst ‖+ 2ηH
√
2AB‖zst − ẑst+1‖+ 4ηH2
√
2AB
√
Φt,h+1 (2AB ≥ A+B)
≤ 3‖ẑst+1 − ẑst ‖+
1
8
‖zst − ẑst+1‖+
H
4
√
Φt,h+1 (η ≤ 116H√2AB )
≤ 3‖zst − ẑst ‖+
25
8
‖zst − ẑst+1‖+
H
4
√
Φt,h+1.
Squaring both sides and using (a+ b+ c)2 ≤ 3(a2 + b2 + c2), we get
η2
(
x̂s
>
t+1Q
s
∗y˜
s − x˜s>Qs∗ŷst+1
)2
≤ 1875
64
(‖zst − ẑst ‖2 + ‖zst − ẑst+1‖2)+ 3H216 Φt,h+1.
Rearranging finishes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 10. Consider a state s ∈ Sh. By the same analysis as in Lemma 2 (specifically Eq.
(16) and Lemma 13), we have
2η(xst − xs∗)>Qst,tyst
≤ ‖xs∗ − x̂st‖2 − ‖xs∗ − x̂st+1‖2 + 2η2‖Qst,tyst −Qst,t−1yst−1‖2 − ‖x̂st+1 − xst‖2 − ‖xst − x̂st‖2.
(35)
We proceed with
2η2‖Qst,tyst −Qst,t−1yst−1‖2
≤ 4η2‖Qst,t
(
yst − yst−1
) ‖2 + 4η2‖ (Qst,t −Qst,t−1) yst−1‖2
≤ 4η2H2A‖yst − yst−1‖21 + 4η2AH4B max
i>h,s′∈Si
‖ys′t − ys
′
t−1‖2 (By Corollary 18)
≤ 4η2H2AB‖yst − yst−1‖2 + 8η2H4AB(Φt−1,h+1 + Φt,h+1)
≤ 1
128
‖yst − yst−1‖2 +
H2
64
(Φt−1,h+1 + Φt,h+1) (η ≤ 116H√2AB )
≤ 1
64
‖yst − ŷst ‖2 +
1
64
‖ŷst − yst−1‖2 +
H2
64
(Φt−1,h+1 + Φt,h+1) . (36)
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We can get the y counterpart of Eq. (35) and Eq. (36) similarly. Combining all these inequalities
leads to
2η(xst − xs∗)>Qst,tyst + 2ηxs
>
t Q
s
t,t(y
s
∗ − yst )
≤ ‖zs∗ − ẑst ‖2 − ‖zs∗ − ẑst+1‖2 +
1
64
‖ẑst − zst−1‖2 −
63
64
‖zst − ẑst ‖2 − ‖ẑst+1 − zst ‖2
+
H2
32
(Φt−1,h+1 + Φt,h+1)
≤ ‖zs∗ − ẑst ‖2 − ‖zs∗ − ẑst+1‖2 +
1
64
‖ẑst − zst−1‖2 −
31
64
‖ẑst+1 − zst ‖2
− 1
2
× 64η
2
1875
max
x˜,y˜
(
x̂s
>
t+1Q
s
∗y˜
s − x˜s>Qs∗ŷst+1
)2
+
1
2
H2Φt,h+1 +
H2
16
(Φt−1,h+1 + Φt,h+1)
(Lemma 20)
≤ ‖zs∗ − ẑst ‖2 − ‖zs∗ − ẑst+1‖2 +
1
64
‖ẑst − zst−1‖2 −
31
64
‖ẑst+1 − zst ‖2
− 32η
2C2
1875
‖ẑst+1 − zs∗‖2 +H2 (Φt−1,h+1 + Φt,h+1) . (by Theorem 5 for some constant C)
(37)
Note that the left-hand side of Eq. (37) can be lower bounded as below:
2η(xst − xs∗)>Qst,tyst + 2ηxs
>
t Q
s
t,t(y
s
∗ − yst )
= 2η(xst − xs∗)>Qs∗yst + 2ηxs
>
t Q
s
∗(y
s
∗ − yst )
+ 2η(xst − xs∗)>(Qst,t −Qs∗)yst + 2ηxs
>
t (Q
s
t,t −Qs∗)(ys∗ − yst )
≥ 2η(xst − xs∗)>(Qst,t −Qs∗)yst + 2ηxs
>
t (Q
s
t,t −Qs∗)(ys∗ − yst ) (by optimality of xs∗ and ys∗)
≥ −2η‖xst − xs∗‖‖(Qst,t −Qs∗)yst ‖ − 2η‖xs
>
t (Q
s
t,t −Qs∗)‖‖ys∗ − yst ‖
(Cauchy-Schwarz inequality)
≥ −η
2C2
1000
‖xst − xs∗‖2 −
1000
C2
‖(Qst,t −Qs∗)yst ‖2 −
η2C2
1000
‖yst − ys∗‖2 −
1000
C2
‖(Qst,t −Qs∗)>xs∗‖2
(AM-GM inequality)
≥ −η
2C2
1000
‖zst − zs∗‖2 −
1000
C2
×H4(A+B)2Φt,h+1 (by Corollary 18)
≥ −η
2C2
500
‖ẑst+1 − zs∗‖2 −
η2C2
500
‖zst − ẑst+1‖2 −
1000
C2
×H4(A+B)2Φt,h+1.
Combining with Eq. (37), we get
‖ẑst+1 − zs∗‖2 ≤ ‖ẑst − zs∗‖2 +
1
64
‖ẑst − zst−1‖2 −
15
32
‖ẑst+1 − zst ‖2 −
28η2C2
1875
‖ẑst+1 − zs∗‖2
+
1001H4(A+B)2
C2
(Φt−1,h+1 + Φt,h+1) .
Without loss of generality, we assume C ≤ 1 (otherwise we can choose C = 1). By rearranging
terms, we have
‖ẑst+1 − zs∗‖2 +
14
32
‖ẑst+1 − zst ‖2 ≤ ‖ẑst+1 − zs∗‖2 +
15
32
· 1
1 + 281875η
2C2
‖ẑst+1 − zst ‖2
≤ 1
1 + 281875η
2C2
(
‖ẑst − zs∗‖2 +
1
64
‖ẑst − zst−1‖2
)
+
1001H4(A+B)2
C2
(Φt−1,h+1 + Φt,h+1) .
Note that the above holds for any zs∗ ∈ Zs∗ . We choose zs∗ = ΠZs∗ (ẑst ). In the following, we use the
notation Ωst = ‖ẑst − ΠZs∗ (ẑst )‖2 and θst = ‖ẑst − zst−1‖2. Using the fact ‖ẑst+1 − ΠZs∗ (ẑst+1)‖ ≤
30
‖ẑst+1 −ΠZs∗ (ẑst )‖, the above implies
Ωst+1 +
7
16
θst+1 ≤
1
1 + 281875η
2C2
(
Ωst +
7
16
θst
)
+
1001× 32H4(A+B)2
7C2
[
max
i>h,s′∈Si
(
Ωs
′
t+1 +
7
16
θs
′
t+1
)
+ max
i>h,s′∈Si
(
Ωs
′
t +
7
16
θs
′
t
)]
because Φt,h = maxi≥h,s′∈Si ‖zs
′
t −zs
′
∗ ‖2 ≤ maxi≥h,s′∈Si
(
2‖zs′t − ẑs
′
t+1‖2 + 2‖ẑs
′
t+1 − zs
′
∗ ‖2
)
=
2 maxi≥h,s′∈Si
(
Ωs
′
t+1 + θ
s′
t+1
)
≤ 327 maxi≥h,s′∈Si
(
Ωs
′
t+1 +
7
16θ
s′
t+1
)
, where we choose zs
′
∗ =
ΠZs′∗ (ẑ
s′
t+1).
Below we further define ζt,h , maxs∈Sh
(
Ωst +
7
16θ
s
t
)
. Then we can further write
ζt+1,h ≤ ζt,h
1 + 281875η
2C2
+
5000H4(A+B)2
C2
(
max
i>h
ζt+1,i + max
i>h
ζt,i
)
. (38)
We use induction to prove that
ζt,h ≤ 2
(
1
1 + 11000η
2C2
)t−1(
2× 106H4(A+B)2
η2C4
)H−h
. (39)
It is clear that t = 1 holds for every layer h.
The last layer. If h = H , then the recursion Eq. (38) implies, for all t ∈ [T ],
ζt,h ≤ 2
(
1
1 + 281875η
2C2
)t−1
≤ 2
(
1
1 + 11000η
2C2
)t−1
.
Previous layers. Suppose that the Eq. (39) holds for layers h+1, . . . ,H and for all t, and suppose
that it holds for time 1, . . . , t for layer h. Then by Eq. (38),
ζt+1,h ≤ 2
1 + 281875η
2C2
(
1
1 + 11000η
2C2
)t−1(
2× 106H4(A+B)2
η2C4
)H−h
+
20000H4(A+B)2
C2
×
(
1
1 + 11000η
2C2
)t−1
×
(
2× 106H4(A+B)2
η2C4
)H−h−1
=
2
1 + 281875η
2C2
(
1
1 + 11000η
2C2
)t−1(
2× 106H4(A+B)2
η2C4
)H−h
+
η2C2
100
×
(
1
1 + 11000η
2C2
)t−1
×
(
2× 106H4(A+B)2
η2C4
)H−h
≤ 2
(
1
1 + 11000η
2C2
)t(
2× 106H4(A+B)2
η2C4
)H−h
, (C < 1)
which finishes the induction.
Note that Eq. (39) implies that
Ωst ≤ ζt,h ≤ 2
(
1
1 + 11000η
2C2
)t−1−(H−h)(log 2×106H4(A+B)2
η2C4
)/
(log(1+ 11000η
2C2))
≤
(
1
1 + 11000η
2C2
)t−O( H−h
η2C2
log HABηC
)
,
which leads to the desired inequality.
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Proof of Theorem 11. By Lemma 16, for any x,
ρxt,yt − ρx,yt =
∑
s∈S
µsx,yt (x
s
t − xs)>Qst,tyst . (40)
Note that (xst − xs)>Qst,tyst is essentially the instantaneous regret of OGDA on the state s at episode
t. By Eq. (35), we have
(xst − xs∗)>Qst,tyst ≤
‖xs∗ − x̂st‖2 − ‖xs∗ − x̂st+1‖2
2η
+ η‖Qst,tyst −Qst,t−1yst−1‖2. (41)
By Lemma 17, for t ≥ 2,
‖Qst,tyst −Qst,t−1yst−1‖2
≤ 2‖Qst,t
(
yst − yst−1
) ‖2 + 2‖ (Qst,t −Qst,t−1) yst−1‖2
≤ 2H2A‖yst − yst−1‖21 + 2H2A
(
H∑
i=h+1
max
s′∈Si
‖ys′t − ys
′
t−1‖1
)2
(By Lemma 17; A , |A|)
≤ 2H2AΘ2t,h + 2H3A
H∑
i=h+1
Θ2t,i, (Θt,h , maxs∈Sh ‖yst − yst−1‖1)
where in the last step we use Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. Also, for t = 1, ‖Qst,tyst −Qst,t−1yst−1‖2 =
O(H2A). Plugging these bounds into Eq. (41), we have for any h,
T∑
t=1
∑
s∈Sh
µsx∗,yt(x
s
t − xs∗)>Qst,tyst
≤
T∑
t=1
∑
s∈Sh
µsx∗,yt‖xs∗ − x̂st‖2 − µsx∗,yt‖xs∗ − x̂st+1‖2
2η
+
T∑
t=2
(
2ηH2AΘ2t,h + 2ηH
3A
H∑
i=h+1
Θ2t,i
)
+O
(
ηH2A
)
(
∑
s∈Sh µ
s
x∗,yt = 1)
≤
T∑
t=2
∑
s∈Sh
‖xs∗ − x̂st‖2
(
µsx∗,yt − µsx∗,yt−1
)
2η
+
T∑
t=1
(
2ηH2AΘ2t,h + 2ηH
3A
H∑
i=h+1
Θ2t,i
)
+O
(∑
s∈Sh µ
s
x∗,y1
η
+ ηH2A
)
≤ 2
T∑
t=2
∑
s∈Sh
∣∣∣µsx∗,yt − µsx∗,yt−1∣∣∣
η
+
T∑
t=2
(
2ηH2AΘ2t,h + 2ηH
3A
H∑
i=h+1
Θ2t,i
)
+O
(
1
η
+ ηH2A
)
≤ 2
T∑
t=2
h−1∑
i=1
Θt,i
η
+
T∑
t=2
(
2ηH2AΘ2t,h + 2ηH
3A
H∑
i=h+1
Θ2t,i
)
+O
(
1
η
+ ηH2A
)
.
(by Lemma 19)
Finally summing over h and combining with Eq. (40) we have
T∑
t=1
(ρxt,yt − ρx∗,yt)
≤ 2
T∑
t=2
H∑
h=1
h−1∑
i=1
Θt,i
η
+
T∑
t=2
(
2ηH2A
H∑
h=1
Θ2t,h + 2ηH
3A
H∑
h=1
H∑
i=h+1
Θ2t,i
)
+O
(
H
η
+ ηH3A
)
= O
(
H
η
T∑
t=2
H∑
h=1
Θt,h + ηH
4A
T∑
t=2
H∑
h=1
Θ2t,h
)
+O
(
H
η
+ ηH3A
)
,
completing the proof.
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